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ABSTRACT 
 
 
AUTHOR    Sulaiman Ahmed 
 
TITLE OF THESIS  The Disagreement between Avicenna and al-Ghazali on the 
Issue of the Pre-eternity of the Universe, how their Arguments 
Originated from Greek Philosophers and their Effect on Muslim 
Philosophers 
 
DEPARTMENT    Humanities and Performing Arts 
University of Wales Trinity Saint David 
DEGREE    Master of Philosophy 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore one of the three condemnations by al-Ghazali of Avicenna in his widely 
publicised book ‘Incoherence of the Philosophers’. The paper will focus on one of these three specific 
issues because it was these topics that were used by al-Ghazali to insinuate that Avicenna had transgressed 
the boundaries of valid traditional Islamic belief (kufr). The refutation of al-Ghazali are found in three 
parochial topics: (I) pre-eternity of matter and temporal nature of the world (II) God’s knowledge of 
particulars and universals, (III) the relationship between the resurrection of the body and the soul. The 
focus of this thesis will be on the issue of presenting the opinions of both the proponents of pre-eternity 
of matter as well as advocates of the universe being created out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo). It will explore 
the opinion of Greek philosophers leading up to Avicenna, then will navigate through the opinion of 
Muslim philosophers and theologians and then finally moving onto the opinions of contemporary 
philosophers and scientists. The thesis will first explore the opinion of Avicenna regarding the pre-eternity 
of the universe and whether his positon traversed the boundaries of Islam and into heresy. The thesis will 
then move onto looking into the opinions and positons of Greek and Muslim philosophers, to enquire 
into the accuracy of the perception that the position of Avicenna was a ‘rogue’ position that was rejected 
by Muslim philosophers. The contention of al-Ghazali and the opinions of latter Muslim theologians will 
be explored in order to give the reader a holistic understanding of these issues so that one can determine 
whether it was philosophically sound for latter scholars to anathematise Avicenna. Finally the thesis will 
explore the relevance of the Avicenna amongst philosophers and scientists in current times.  
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Literature Review 
 
There have been a significant number of scholars from a wide variety of backgrounds who have 
contributed to the discussion about the pre-eternity of the universe. This includes the contribution 
made by Muslim scholars in the field of Islamic philosophy. Based on this it wasn’t prudent to include 
the positions and arguments of all scholars who have contributed to this field. Therefore there was a 
need to choose specific scholars and as such there were are a number of factors involved in deciding 
which scholars to include in this thesis. The focus of this thesis is on al-Ghazali and Avicenna and 
the interaction of their arguments with past and contemporary scholars, because al-Ghazali took this 
disagreement a step further by issuing a statement that the position of Avicenna is tantamount to 
disbelief (kufr). This led to the perception that Avicenna was completely abandoned and due to this 
he was considered a heretic by Muslims within the field of Islamic scholarship.
1
 In this literature 
review I will attempt to explain my reasoning for including the specific scholars that I have chosen 
for my thesis.  
The objectives of the thesis was to analyse the arguments of Avicenna and al-Ghazali, to compare 
their positons to the accepted beliefs within Islamic philosophy and theology. To examine the 
positions of Greek philosophers and whether these positons were introduced into Islamic 
                                                          
1 Ahmad bin Hanbal, ‘Ar-Radd Jahmiyyah waz-Zanaadiqah’ (Daaruth-Thabaat, 1st edition), Page 143-146   
Taqī ad-Dīn Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah  Majmoo’ al-Fataawa (King Fahd Publications , Saudi Arabia 2004), Volume 9 
Page 135-138 
Taqī ad-Dīn Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, Ta'aaradh al-'Aql wan-Naql (Dar-ul-Imaam Ahmad), Volume 5, Page 65  
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Eghaathat al-Lahfaan,  (Al Ashqar University, Riyadh, 2003), Volume 2, Page 287 
Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani, Lisaan al-Meezaan, (Maktab al-Matbu'at al-Islamiyyah Beirut, Lebanon, 2002), Volume 2 
Page 293 
Yahyah J. Michot, MAMLŪK THEOLOGIAN'S COMMENTARY ON AVICENNA'S "RISĀLA AḌḤAWIYYA": BEING A 
TRANSLATION OF A PART OF THE "DARʾ AL-TAʿĀRUḌ" OF IBN TAYMIYYA, WITH INTRODUCTION, ANNOTATION, 
AND APPENDICES: PART I, Journal of Islamic Studies Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 2003), Page 149-203 
Accessed 27/08/2018 
[http://www.islamweb.net/emainpage/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=87783] 
Accessed 27/08/2018 http://www.asharis.com/creed/articles/mrsit-why-ibn-sina-you-exceedingly-shrewd-
kafir-thank-you-for-supporting-our-aristotel.cfm 
Muhammad Saalih al-'Uthaymeen, At-Ta’leeq al-Mukhtasar ‘al-Qasidah an-Nooniyyah, (Unpublished), Volume 
3, page 1328 
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philosophy. Was the positon of al-Ghazali original or did he fall into the same trap that he claims 
that Avicenna fell into by parroting the positons of Greek philosophers? Was Avicenna’s position 
unique only to him or was it a position that was accepted by other Islamic philosophers and 
theologians? Did the entirety of Islamic scholarship consider his position heretical or were they 
scholars from orthodox Islam who either accepted his position or remained neutral on the issue? 
Therefore there were specific related reasons for including the philosophers that have been chosen 
to be included into this thesis.  
There were a number of reasons for including the positon of Aristotle in this thesis. One of the 
arguments of the opponent of Avicenna was that he distorted Islamic philosophy and theology by 
introducing Greek philosophy into Islam through the ideas of Aristotle. They went further by 
claiming that Avicenna was merely re-producing the position of Avicenna without much innovation. 
The position of Aristotle was discussed in the debate between Al-Biruni and Avicenna where they 
deliberated on the specifics of Aristotle’s model of the universe and whether his model includes the 
existence of a creator. As such we will analyse his arguments and look at whether the charges levelled 
at Avicenna hold merit.     
Philo of Alexandria was a Greek philosopher who held that the universe was eternal. The reason why 
it was felt that his argument was pertinent enough to be included into this thesis was because he wrote 
against the Stoics who held that that world is temporal. Now in the thesis we will explore the positons 
of al-Ghazali and one of the arguments that will be made is that al-Ghazali replicated some of the 
arguments of the stoics, and as such Philo’s refutation of the stoics is relevant to the debate that will 
be presented in the thesis.     
The arguments of Proculus were included by John Philoponus in his book in order to refute them. 
Proculus was a famous proponent for the eternity of the universe. The arguments of John Philoponus 
were later reproduced by al-Ghazali and later Asharis and therefore it became necessary to include 
both Proclus and Jon Philoponus in order for the reader to understand the origins of some of the 
arguments of Al-Ghazali. If one of main insinuations made on Avicenna was that he introduced 
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Greek Philosophy into Islamic philosophy then what makes such an argument all the more interesting 
is that despite the accusations made by al-Ghazali he felt into the same problem my reproducing 
many of the early arguments of the Stoics, John Philoponus and other early Greek/Christian/Jewish 
philosophers who argued for the temporal nature of the universe.  
Al-Maturidi is the founder of one of the major orthodox Sunni schools which followed the doctrine 
of Imam Abu Hanifa. Now Avicenna was rejected by orthodox Muslims and he was considered a 
heretic due to his opinions and ideas. This thesis presents his idea from a multitude of angles and 
one of these angles is whether his position falls in line with accepted orthodox position of Islam 
despite the fact that he was considered a renegade by Muslim philosophers and theologians. The 
thesis in fact goes one step further in arguing that his position falls far more in line with orthodox 
Islam compared to the position of al-Ghazali. Now a possible counter to this argument is that al-
Maturidi argued that the universe is temporal and therefore the position of Avicenna does not fall in 
line with orthodox Islam. Therefore it became important to present a detailed analysis of the 
arguments of Maturidi, in order to show the readers that his position was not refuted by al-Maturidi 
and in fact Maturidi looks at the eternity of the universe from a different angle. Another important 
reason for including Maturdi is that there is limited work done on him both in Arabic and English, 
and therefore it gives the reader of the thesis a unique opportunity to understand the arguments of 
Maturidi. The thesis will show that the arguments of Avicenna are in line with theological ‘principles’ 
of the Maturidi School.  
More time is spent with the arguments of Avicenna and al-Ghazali, as the main basis of the current 
problem lies with them. But it was important maintain a balance, because after a careful analysis of 
the positions of al-Ghazali and Avicenna, another important aspect of the thesis is the origination of 
their ideas as well as how scholars who came later dealt with the positons of these scholars. Was it 
that Avicenna was not accepted by Muslim scholars for over a thousand years or was it an idea 
concocted with those who had the loudest voices and the most power, and it was due to this that it 
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became known as the ‘truth’, which is that Avicenna was a heretic and had traversed the boundaries 
of the orthodox Islam?  
Al-Biruni was included in the thesis as he was a contemporary of Avicenna, and their exchange of 
letters, where they debated multiple issues which included the matter of the eternity of the universe
2
, 
which was well known during that time and it still remains known in current times. Al-Biruni was a 
scholar of the Royal Palace and he was given the duty of debating with Avicenna, and this discussion 
occurred over multiple letters. This letter exchange is very interesting, not only due to the fact that 
Al-Biruni was a famous scholar who disagreed with Avicenna but also due to the political dynamics 
that were involved within the discussion. Had Avicenna ‘slipped up’ it may have resulted in 
imprisonment or death, as such a careful reply was imperative.  
The addition of Ibn Tufayl to the thesis was interesting due to him clearly respecting Avicenna. This 
can been by the fact that he title his allegory ‘Hayy ibn Yaqzan’3, the same name that was used by 
Avicenna in his very own famous allegory.
4
 Despite him admiring Avicenna he analyses the issue of 
eternity of the universe and comes to the conclusion that both arguments fall within the framework 
of Islamic philosophy and theology and that he feels that one argument isn’t any stronger than the 
other argument.      
Averroes is well known for his famous refutation ‘The Incoherence of the Incoherence of the 
Philosophers’ on the book of al-Ghazali called ‘The incoherence of the philosophers’.5  He was an 
advocate of the philosophy of Avicenna and was very vocal in his support of the position of the pre-
eternity of the universe. He felt that the arguments of al-Ghazali were weak, lacked substance and 
foresight. The sole purpose of his book was a rebuttal of the book of al-Ghazali. As such it imperative 
to include his positon and ideas into this thesis.   
                                                          
2 Berjak R, The Medieval Arabic Era: Ibn Sina-Al-Biruni Correspondence, Trans by Rafik Berjak, (2005)  
3 Ibn Tufayl, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, Trans Goodman L. E, (The University Chicago Press, Chicago, 2009) 
4 Corbin H, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, (Princeton University Press, 2014) 
5 Averroes, Tahafut al-Tahafut, (Dar al-Ma’arif, Cairo, Egypt, 1964), 
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Fakhr al-Din al-Razi was a famous Ashari scholar, a group within Islamic theology which have 
followers that make up around ninety percent of the Sunni Muslim world. The Ashari School is 
considered one of the two orthodox Sunni Muslim schools. Razi is considered one of the founding 
fathers of the school, because despite the fact that the school is named after Abul Hasan al-Ashari, a 
huge proportion of his positons are not found in the Ashari School. Instead the ideas of Razi, Ghazali 
and Juwayni were the foundational pillars of the theological and philosophical ideas that are found 
within the school. The fact that Avicenna is considered a heretic amongst orthodox Muslims and 
even more so by adherent of the Ashari school it was important to show that despite this Razi, a 
leading Ashari, did not consider the positon of Avicenna to be heretical and actually in fact he felt 
that Ghazali did not understand the position of Avicenna, and that in his opinion the disagreement 
between them was merely semantics.  
Tusi was another vocal follower of the position of Avicenna. He wrote Sharh al-isharat
6
 which is a 
commentary on Avicenna's book Al-isharat wa al-Tanbihat (Remarks and Admonitions).
7
 He argued 
against the position of Razi and felt that the disagreement between al-Ghazali and Avicenna was a 
real and substantial disagreement. He argued for the pre-eternity of the universe, and did this from 
multiple angles, he was a clear follower of the methodology of Avicenna.  
Adhudiddin al-Iji and Sayf al-Din al-Amidi are famous Ashari scholars, and were substantial in the 
development of the positions of the school. So after the positions of Razi, Ghazali and Juwayni laid 
the foundations of the schools, it was scholars such Iji and Amidi and their ideas that were important 
in the expansion of the school. Therefore when they argue that the positions of Avicenna are not 
heretical and instead fall within the acceptable framework of the theology and philosophy of the 
religion it has a significant impact on a huge proportion of Muslims. This is quite important in the 
thesis as it shows for the first time that not all scholars rejected Avicenna and considered him a heretic. 
                                                          
6 Tusi N, Sharh al-Isharat Wa Al-Tanbihat, (Cairo, Egypt, Dar al-Marifa, 1996), 
7 Avicenna, Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, Dar al-Ma’arif, (Cairo, Egypt, 1985) 
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Instead it was only a few scholars such as al-Ghazali who had a large impact on the perception of the 
rest of the Muslim world.  
At this point we have seen that the position of Avicenna that the world is eternal was not rejected by 
all orthodox Muslims and nor did they consider him heretic. We have in fact shown that significant 
figures from within the Ashari School, did not feel that his positon was heretical and instead it fell 
within the accepted framework of the philosophy and theology of the religion. Next the thesis look 
at Ibn Arabi a famous Sufi scholar. Again the perception amongst Sufi is that the position of Avicenna 
was heretical and therefore demonstrating to them in this thesis that in reality Ibn Arabi held the 
same position that the universe was eternal and he argue that he came to hold the position through 
spiritual enlightenment. Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi was another Sufi mystic. One of his teachers, 
Majd al-Din al-Jili was also the teacher of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, the famous Ashari scholar we 
mentioned previously. Al-Suhrawardi was also an ardent follower of the philosophy of Avicenna. His 
inclusion in the thesis shows that despite being a Sufi, in his philosophy he followed Avicenna and 
due to both of these factors he held that the universe is eternal.  
Jurjani was a famous Hanafi scholar and as such was a follower of the second orthodox Sunni 
theological school which are the Matuirids. He supported the position of the pre-eternity of the 
universe despite being traditional Sunni scholar of Islam. Therefore his inclusion in the thesis shows 
that once again, not only was Avicenna not considered a heretic by all, but instead in some instances 
his position was regarding the pre-eternity of the universe was followed by prominent scholars. 
The intended outcome of this thesis is to show the positions of the Greek philosophers and to 
demonstrate that despite the refutation and claim of al-Ghazali, many of his ideas originated from 
Greek philosophers and other philosopher such as John Philoponus. Despite the claim of al-Ghazali, 
Avicenna did not mimic the position of Aristotle and instead his ideas were original to him. The 
thesis then moves onto analysing the position of Avicenna, the analysis of the refutation of al-Ghazli 
and Al-Biruni and the retort of Averroes and Tusi regarding the specific issue of the pre-eternity of 
the universe. After this we looked at whether Avicenna really was rejected by all scholars and whether 
12 
 
his positions were considered heretical. As such we look at scholars from the two main Sunni schools 
of theology which are the Ashari and Maturidi School, and through this analyses we find that famous 
Ashari scholars such as Razi, Iyji and Amidi, as well as a famous Maturidi scholar such as Jurjani all 
argued that the position of Avicenna fell within the accepted framework of Sunni theological Islam 
and some even went further to argue for the position of the pre-eternity of the universe. The thesis 
then also included famous Sufi scholars such Ibn Arabi and Suharwardi, both of whom argued for 
the pre-eternity of the universe demonstrating that believing in the pre-eternity of the universe does 
not take someone out of the fold of Islam. As such this thesis was the first to tackle the issue of the 
pre-eternity of the universe from a wide variety of angles and we saw that the perception of Avicenna 
is far from the reality. 
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Prologue 
 
My aim in this thesis to understand how we arrived at today’s theological and philosophical ideas 
concerning one of the three areas of interest to Avicenna and the Peripatetic School (broadly (I) The pre-
eternity of matter and temporal nature of the world (II) God’s knowledge of particulars and universals, 
(III) The relationship between the resurrection of the body and the soul) - both in general and in Islam 
in particular. This thesis will focus on the first issue which is the topic of the pre-eternity of the world. 
Avicenna has been almost completely abandoned and rejected by modern day Muslim theologians 
(beyond lip service) as part of an exile that has existed for a thousand years, with the mere mention of 
him in a positive light resulting in you also being harassed in today’s Islamic theological and philosophical 
community. In short, Avicenna is considered a heretic.
8
 His ‘exile’ is famous and the reason understood 
by many is that it was due to his positions on these three issues, all which were, according to most Muslims, 
refuted by the 11
th
 century theologian Imam Ghazali. I believe that in reality, it was his ideology that was 
disliked and these issues were merely used as excuses.  
After the time of the Prophet Muhammed, there were many Muslim camps, with different ideologies, 
philosophies, theologies, legal jurisprudence and methodologies. If one were to simplify their positions 
then one could put them into two distinct camps. Both camps believed in the Quran being a religious text 
that should be followed, but what should be used after this is where they disagree and what has resulted 
in a huge conflict within Sunni Islam. The first camp believed in the importance of using the intellect. 
They believed that one should only be using Hadith (purported sayings of the Prophet Muhammad - a 
secondary source according to this group) where they conform to the principals of the Quran as well as 
the intellect. It meant that this group rejected many hadith. Based on the importance they placed on the 
intellect, they were responsible for many if not all of the Islamic advancements in science, mathematics 
and philosophy. Groups that were included in this camp were the Maturidi’s, Mutazalite, and the Mutjai 
and generally these groups followed the Hanafi Jurisprudential School. Avicenna, Abu Mansur Al 
Mautridi and Imam Abu Hanifa were included in this group. The second camp did not believe in the 
                                                          
8 Shahrastani, The Summa Philosophiae of al-Shahrastiani, Trans A Guillaume (London, 1934), p33 
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importance of the intellect and viewed hadith as almost to the same level as the Quran itself. They believed 
in following the sources without questioning their authenticity (for example if a hadith is narrated in a 
famous collection such as Bukhari, it was considered heretical to question its authenticity). This camp 
includes the Hanbalis
9
, the modern day Salafists as well as the Shafis, and it would include people such 
al-Ghazali, Imam Shafi and Imam Ahmed. These camps were in an academic and literal battle during the 
beginning of Islam and once the second group won it meant that Avicenna and people who agreed with 
his ideology were discarded. In order to survive, the first camp incorporated many of the principles and 
ideologies of the second camp into the makeup of their group to the point where over time both became 
almost indistinguishable. It meant Avicenna was not really accepted by either camp. Ideas such as killing 
apostates, burning homosexuals, beating wives and typically extremist ideas, which were taken from 
secondary sources such as hadith become the ‘Islam’ that were followed by many if not most Muslims.  
This wasn’t the only problem that people had with Avicenna and anyone who held these ideas and 
positions. Another issue was that he opposed the theology of the Hanbalites (and their contemporary 
inheritors the Salafists).  They believed in anthropomorphist ideas such as God having physical body parts 
and other theological positions such as the Quran being uncreated. As the ruler during the time of 
Avicenna was Qadr Billa an adherent follower of the Hanblite ideology he was an opponent of Avicenna 
and anyone who held the same positions.  Despite Avicenna being in the service of the ruler of Bukara, 
he also lived through the reign of the infamous Muslim Caliph Qadir Billa. Qadir Billa forced the 
Hanafi Mutazalites to make public repentance for the theological positions that they held, he also 
banned them as well as the Rawafidh (Shia) from holding any public discussions, and therefore they 
had to speak about their positions in secrecy. Prince Mahmud under the instructions of Qadr Billa 
burnt, killed, imprisoned and banished many of the Hanafi Mutazalites and Shia. He also ordered 
that people should curse them in the mosques as they were heretics.
10
 He even made a ruling that 
whoever says the Quran is created is an apostate and he must be killed.
11
 (This was a theological discussion 
                                                          
9 (يلبنحلا) The transliteration is Hanbali, it can be referred to  as Hanabila depending on context. Also see 
(http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e799) 
10 Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam fil Akhbar al-Muluk wa’l-Umam, (Hyderabad, Dairatul-Ma‘arifil-Uthmaniyyah, 
1939), Volume 7, Page 287 
11 Ibid, Page 289 
Islamic Encyclopaedia, (Markaz al-Shariqah lil-Ibda’ al-Fikriy), Page 234 
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between the Hanafis and the Hanbalis, the main contributors to the disagreement were Abd al Aziz al-
Makki and Bishr al-Marisi
12). Qadr Billah’s tough stance against the Hanafi Mutazalite, Shia and 
Philosophers included them being killed and their books were burnt.
13
 Due to this Avicenna was disliked 
by the Ghazanawid kings who wanted him killed due to Avicenna working against them in Isfahan.
14
 
By the end of his reign Hanabli Islam was in complete authority and all opposition, namely the Hanafis 
and Shia had been completely subjugated. The reason why this is relevant is that not only was Avicenna 
a philosopher but his ideas conflicted with the Hanabali ideology of Qadr Billa. His position on the pre-
eternity of the universe, Gods’ knowledge of particulars and the destruction of the soul are clear examples 
of this disagreement.  
These theological and philosophical battles that Avicenna faced and lost due to those in power holding 
the opposite positions meant that Islam morphed into what is followed by many extremists today - the 
ideology propagated by his opponents. It meant that Islam became an anti-intellectual religion where it is 
not permissible to question the status quo. The intellect has been relegated to something which has no 
significance. Even though Avicenna was despised by the opposing groups, what caused him to become 
more completely rejected was the later 11
th
 century Sunni theologian al-Ghazali. The eradication of 
Avicenna from the history of Islam and even by his own group of Hanafis and those who opposed 
anthropomorphism was fuelled by al-Ghazali, a theologian, philosopher and Sufi Mystic that is accepted 
by Sunni Muslims. He was considered the person who was helping to preserve Islam from the destruction 
caused by Philosophers such as Aristotle who had influenced a new generation of Muslim theologians 
and philosophers such as Avicenna. His book ‘The Incoherence of the Philosophers’ was considered a 
work that was written to help preserve Islam from its alleged enemies - the philosophers and Avicenna. 
The three issues that were dealt with by al-Ghazali and were considered a refutation of Avicenna and the 
philosophers, was one of the main reasons for Avicenna being considered a heretic and his ideas being 
discarded. His opponents used this refutation to further support their ideas and positions. It means that 
                                                          
12 Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam fil Akhbar al-Muluk wa’l-Umam, (Hyderabad, Dairatul-Ma‘arifil-Uthmaniyyah, 
1939), Volume 7, Page 289 
13 Jazari, A, al-Kamil fi al-Tareekh, (Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, Beirut, Lebanon, 1987), Volume 8, Page 171 
14 Islamic Encyclopaedia (Markaz al-Shariqah lil-Ibda’ al-Fikriy), Page 234 
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it is important that we analyse these ideas to see if al-Ghazali right in his refutation of Avicenna or was this 
refutation severely lacking and only gained traction due to the huge negativity against Avicenna. 
I am going to attempt to show that the ideas of Avicenna on the issue of pre-eternity of matter and the 
temporal nature of the world was not heretical and that in actual fact it was a position that should be held 
by Muslim who don’t agree with anthropomorphist ideas. Another allegation made against Avicenna is 
that he was merely mimicking the positions of Aristotle and other Philosophers and that al-Ghazali’s was 
attempting to save Islam from the influence of the philosophers. We will see in the thesis that in actual 
fact although many of his positons were held by Greek philosophers such as Aristotle, he did develop and 
shed light on these ideas from an alternative angle. Also in terms of al-Ghazali, his positions were also not 
solely form Islamic theology, but in fact he did take his positons from Greek philosophers such as the 
stoics as well as other theologians such John Philoponus.  
It is also thought amongst Muslims that the position of Avicenna regarding these issues was completely 
ignored by Muslim theologians as they understood that the positions will lead to the person to be thrown 
out of the fold of Islam. But in reality this was not the case. I will attempt to show in this thesis that there 
were many theologians from the opposing group who also either held the same positon as Avicenna or 
felt that these wasn’t issues that should result in anathematisation. This was a position held by theologians, 
philosophers and Sufi Mystics who are considered important figures from Sunni Islam and are followed 
and accepted by a huge proportion of contemporary Muslims. 
We will also look at whether the position of Avicenna is relevant to current arguments on this issue. In 
terms of pre-eternity of the universe the argument in current times has been taken over by physicists such 
as Roger Penrose and his ‘Conformal Cyclic Cosmology’ argument or Lee Smolin’s book ‘Time Reborn’. 
We will also look at more current philosophical positions on the issue of time such as the argument of 
McTaggart against the reality of time.  
I believe that Muslims are facing a crisis of identity with the current version of Islam which is the result of 
the political defeat of the ideas of Avicenna and those who agree with his positions. Ideas such killing 
apostates, burning homosexuals, beating wives and extremism can be found in the version of Islam by 
Avicenna’s opponents. People do not have an alternative because the people who held alternate ideas are 
considered heretics and disbelievers due to the positions that they held and the fact that they value the 
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importance of intellectual thought. These scholars hold a blind adherence to the text of past scholars, 
without questioning any fallacies that may come about from these statements and texts. Now the text of 
these scholars does hold some importance but what is more imperative is that one compares these 
statement to the Usul (principles of the religion. Some modern writer such as Shahab Ahmed have 
presented a picture of the religion which involves detaching Islam from all principles and text, but this 
idea is not accepted by any Muslims.
15
 
Even though in recent times Avicenna has been embraced by Western academics and orientalists, this 
affect has not trickled down to Muslim scholars and Muslims in general. As such the relegation of 
Avicenna into the fringes of scholarship due to his alleged ‘heresy’ remains a pertinent issue. The reason 
why these often violent and problematic hadith, issue and views about scholars such as Avicenna are even 
more problematic when found in Islam is because of the psychology and the level of adherence of its 
followers. Let’s take for example a verse from the Bible: “If, however, the charge is true and no proof of 
the young woman’s virginity can be found, she shall be brought to the door of her father’s house and there 
the men of her town shall stone her to death.”16 In current times, generally speaking, amongst Christians 
you will have three types of people, the first are those who know about this law and if given the opportunity 
would follow it, the second category of people are those who know about the law and don’t/won’t follow 
it and the third group of people are those who are completely ignorant/unaware of this legislation. And 
of course, the first group is by far the smallest and the last two the biggest vis a vis Christians (and others) 
today. On the other hand, amongst Muslims, generally speaking you won’t find the second category of 
people. Muslims are either aware of the law and the position of the scholars and follow it without 
questioning or they are ignorant/unaware of the legislation. As such, a great emphasis is placed upon us 
to filter out the extreme, violent and problematic hadith, rulings or dismissal of certain scholrs such as 
Avicenna who are rejected due to their alleged heresy. When these Hadith, rulings or allegation against 
scholars such as Avicenna are  examined, one finds that they have some problem with either the matn 
(text), the isnaad (chain) or in the case of Avicenna and scholars of his ilk the reality is different to the 
                                                          
15 Ahmed Shahab, What is Islam?: The importance of being Islamic, (Princeton University Press, 2015) 
Averroes, Summary of Aristotle Physics, Rasail ibn Rushd (Hyderabad, 1947) 266a, Page 6-9 
16 Deuteronomy 22:20-21 
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perception. The truth of the above can be seen from the frequent strategy of Islamophobes in our time – 
they realise that Muslims as a group, are more ‘practising’ and more willing to defend the authenticity of 
their texts – not just the Quran but also the often spurious fatwas and hadith of sources effectively treated 
as infallible – Imams like Ghazali, Shafi or Bukhari. This banal tendency is very effectively weaponised 
by Islamophobes, who when ignoring violent passages from the Bible or other religions, merely point out 
that no Christian follows these or believes in them – effectively giving the ‘Judeo-Christian’ civilization a 
free pass because hardly anyone in the public eye really believes in its foundational dogmas or texts any 
longer. Hence the frequent references from these people to show violent hadith and then to opinion polls 
from the Muslim world claiming to show the percentages of people who ‘believe’ in these hadith or more 
often ‘Sharia’. This is a perverse and false argument, but there is a need amongst these religious clergy 
who then affect the entire Muslim population that religion be exclusivist and difficult to rationalise, difficult 
to practice and nigh on impossible to defend to show how ‘authentic’ and heroic they are (for example, 
because of the idiosyncratic and difficult way they dress or arrange their facial hair and social interactions) 
and how much ‘faith’ they display. But the whole process is demonstrably false – Muslims have been 
largely persuaded to defend to the hilt every hadith of ‘Bukhari’, every ruling and positon of scholars, 
without ever knowing what these are and if such defence is necessary or traditional: had they been properly 
informed about either, by their self-appointed religious leaders. It is due to this that when past scholars 
such as al-Ghazali have relegated philosophers such as Avicenna to the fringes of the religion and argue 
that he is a heretic, this affects religious leaders, who in turn affect the psychology and opinions of the rest 
of Muslims. 
The abandonment of intellectual thought has resulted in Muslim Philosophers and theologians stagnating, 
from previously having luminaries such as Avicenna - the first to perform the appendectomy - or Jabbar 
ibn Hayyan who was considered the father of chemistry and the first to work on Artificial Intelligence or 
the works of Averroes. All of these developments were by scholars who followed the position of the first 
camp, the people who lost due to the strength of the political powers. It resulted in the use of the intellect 
not being accepted. By tackling the issues that caused Avicenna to be labelled a heretic we can help 
towards bringing back these philosophers and more importantly their ideology of using the intellect, and 
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secondary sources only being accepted if they meet a vigorous authentication process of being compared 
to the Quran as well as the intellect. 
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Disagreement between Avicenna and al-Ghazali 
 
 
It is imperative that the three issues which were used to by latter day theologians and philosophers to 
judge Avicenna as a ‘heretic’ and a ‘disbeliever’ are discussed in detail in this dissertation, so that one can 
understand the positions from both contrasting viewpoints. As a result one will be able to appreciate that 
Avicenna being declared a ‘heretic’ is not as clear cut as is presented by the majority of Muslims in current 
times. The fact that Avicenna was refuted by al-Ghazali resulted in him being disowned by the Muslim 
world, which had a detrimental impact in progress in philosophy, theology and science. Avicenna’s world 
view as we will see is very complex and is the complete opposite to the prevalent anthropomorphist view 
that has seeped into Muslim theology in current times. We will see that the position of Avicenna was due 
to him holding a rigid stance in ensuring that God was never relegated to the same level as his creation. 
In his famous book ‘Incoherence of the Philosophers’ al-Ghazali refuted philosophers on twenty points, 
seventeen of them are considered issues of ‘heresy’ and three of them are considered issues of ‘disbelief’. 
The difference between these two categories is that when one is declared a ‘heretic’ it means that he is 
still a Muslim but his view is considered outside the mainstream view within Islam. As such he is a Muslim 
but the view is considered an abomination.  On the other hand, when something is considered an issue 
of disbelief it means that the contravening view is such that it is outside the accepted tenants of Islam, and 
as a result a person can longer be considered a believer. After careful analysis of the refutations of the 
philosophers from al-Ghazali one comes to the realisation that Avicenna did not hold the entirety of the 
twenty positions and there is even a disagreement about whether Avicenna actually held the three positions 
that al-Ghazali used to issue Takfeer (a statement of disbelief) on Avicenna. Although he never mentioned 
Avicenna by name when speaking about these three issues, many later scholars took this as a specific 
refutation of Avicenna. This caused many scholars who came later to speak out against Avicenna as well 
as his positions, although there were some scholars who supported his position, either specifically by 
writing a detailed response to the positions of al-Ghazali or by holding the same position as Avicenna 
which is displayed in their books, whilst there were some who felt that there wasn’t a real substantial 
disagreement between Avicenna an al-Ghazali and as such remained neutral on the issue. 
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The first issue of contention and one of the three fundamental issues that al-Ghazali believed was an issue 
of disbelief that was held by Avicenna was about the pre-eternity of the universe. Due to the word limit 
and to give the topic justice, this will be the focus of the thesis. This topic deals with the two distinct 
opposing views. Both groups agree that God is the eternal creator of the universe, the disagreement is 
regarding the created universe. One group of people hold that the universe has a start point in time, 
whereas the other group hold that that there is no start point in time and instead the universe is eternal. 
The origin of the universe is a pertinent question debated, discussed and researched by philosophers and 
scientists throughout time. In current times the research and analysis of this issue has mainly being 
overtaken by physicists. The most common held position amongst scientists in current times is the ‘Big 
Bang’ theory. But the questions is that have scientists and more specifically physicists and philosophers 
answered important questions such as was there time and space before the big bang (because time is the 
measurement of matter)? Can the matter which exploded, exist outside of time and space? When did 
time actually begin? Was there a start point for space? Despite this theory being prevalent there are 
alternative models researched by scientists such as ‘Conformal Cyclic Cosmology’ a position held by 
Roger Penrose. He argued that the ‘Big Bang’ was not the start point of the universe but instead it was an 
evolution point as it moved back and forth between points of expansion and contraction over time. For 
the philosophers who are specifically dealing with this, the question is whether the universe had a start 
point or whether the universe is pre-eternal. Some misunderstand this disagreement by simplifying it into 
two separate positions, those who believe in the start of the universe and God and those who hold the 
position of pre-eternity and therefore do not believe in God. But in fact this is an error because Avicenna 
held the position that despite the created universe having no beginning, he still believed in a creator but 
instead he attempted to absolve the creator from any type of affect from time or space, which is something 
we will explore later in this dissertation. Avicenna even defended Aristotle by explaining that his position 
of pre-eternity did not mean that the universe did not have a creator.  
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Brief Biography of Avicenna and al-Ghazali 
 
 
It is important to read a brief biography of these two major personalities of history in order to understand 
the motivation behind their books and more specifically their ideas which are related to this issue.  
 
 
Al-Ghazali 
 
Abu Ḥamid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazali famously known as al-Ghazali is an eleventh century 
Muslim sufi, theologian and philosopher. He was born in Tabaran a district of Tus located in Iran. Imam 
Ghazali was given the title of Hujjatul Islam, as he was considered by his peers as well as latter day scholars 
as the defender of Islam.
17
 Al-Ghazali explained that his initial intention for studying theology and 
jurisprudence was due to his desire for wealth and fame.
18
 Although later in life he changed his intentions 
when he had his spiritual epiphany. When al-Ghazali was twenty he went to study at the renowned 
educational Nizamiyyah Academy in Nishapur. He studied under the famous Ashari scholar Abu al-
Ma’ali al-Juwayni better known as Imam al Haramayn, who even until current times along with al-Ghazali 
is considered a pillar of Ashari theology. Al-Ghazali was appointed director of theology in the Nizmiyyah 
Academy by Nizam al-Mulk, the vizier of the ruler Malikshah. This position was the highest academic 
position that could be held in the Muslim world and al-Ghazali at the age of thirty four was the youngest 
person to achieve it. He studied philosophy extensively and it was during this time that he came to the 
realisation that once cannot achieve certainty of belief by reasoning alone. Due to this reason he went into 
seclusion, in order to master the way of the Sufis and to connect to God - this part of his journey took 
eleven years. It was after this journey he wrote his famous work ‘Ihya ulm al-Din’ (The Reviving of the 
Sciences of Religion). His movement towards Sufim left him disliked by scholars who were anti-Sufi and 
                                                          
17 Al-Ghazali, Al-Munqidh Min al-Dalal, Trans by W. Montgomery Watt in his Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī, 
(London, 1953), Page 75 
18 Al-Subki (Taj al-Din), Tabaqat al-Shafi’iyyah al-Kubra, (Cairo, 1906), Volume 4, Page 102 
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it is this anti-Sufi ideology that can be found in current times amongst the Hanablites and Salafists. For 
example Ibn al-Jawzi a twelfth century Hanabli-Salafist scholar states that look at how cheaply al-Ghazali 
has traded orthodox theology for Sufism.
19
 Ibn Taymiyyah a fourteenth century Hanbali-Salafist scholar, 
who is the ideological father of contemporary Salafism stated that al-Ghazali had left theology for 
philosophy. Qadi Ibn Hamdin actually issued a legal ruling (fatwa) that the book of al-Ghazali should be 
burnt and destroyed throughout Spain.
20
 His books were ordered to be destroyed in North Africa too 
during the reign of Sultan Tashifin. His book the Ihya was also ordered to be destroyed, by way of another 
legal fatwa by the now famous judge al-Mazari, a Maliki-Ashari scholar. So despite the fact that al-Ghazali 
was considered as the defender of ‘orthodoxy’ he still wasn’t considered orthodox by many of his peers 
or latter day scholars who themselves are considered orthodox. To make matters even more complicated, 
Averroes who wrote a refutation of the book of al-Ghazali called ‘The Incoherence of the Incoherence” 
and accused al-Ghazali of being a hypocrite and insincere as he argues that al-Ghazalis attack on the 
Philosophers was merely to appease and garner support from the scholars who were considered 
orthodox.
21
 
After his return from seclusion, he felt that it was his duty to destroy what he believed was the heresy and 
disbelief that were found in many Islamic ideologies and he took it upon himself to be the saviour of 
Islam. Also during this time Fakhr al-Mulk, the son of Nizam al-Mulk, and the vizier to Sultan Sanjar, 
gave him his old position as chair of theology, which after some reluctance he accepted. After a short 
period of time he retired from this position and open his own centre of learning. He followed the Ashari 
theological school although after his journey of tassuwuf (Sufi spirituality) and some of his opinions 
morphed to include a more rational approach. Therefore, one may find that some of the opinions that 
are found in his refutation of the philosophers were actually later incorporated by Imam Ghazali into his 
own belief system. His refutation of the neo-Platonist philosophy resulted in relegating philosophy to the 
periphery of Islamic thought and according to some was the single most defining factor that resulted in 
the freeze of scientific progress within the Islamic world.  His famous work ‘Incoherence of the 
                                                          
19 Jamal al-Din ibn al-Jauzi, al-Namūs fi Talbis Iblis, (Cairo, 1921), Page 377 
20 Nadawi M.H, Afkar-i Ghazālī, (Lahore, 1956), Page 61-73 
21 Averroes, Kitab al-Kashf an Manahij al-Adillah, (Cairo, 1901), Page 57 
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Philosophers’ was a book solely dedicated to be a refutation of those scholars he felt were proponents of 
incorporating Greek Philosophy into Islamic ideology. One of the main perpetrators of this philosophy 
according to him was Avicenna. There were three main issues that he believed that Avicenna had 
transgressed into the realm of disbelief and these issues were the pre-eternity of matter, God’s knowledge 
of particulars and the resurrection of the body and the soul. 
 
 
Avicenna22 
Avicenna
23
 was a Muslim philosopher, theologian, physician and mathematician. He was famous in the 
West for being the pioneer of the appendix operation. He is also well known in the philosophical 
community for his contribution and his propagation of Aristotelian philosophy into Islamic thought.. 
Avicenna was born in Afshana
24
 and later moved with his parents to Bukhara. His father moved to 
the city of Bukhara to work as a governor of Kharmitan. His father and brother were highly respected 
amongst the Isma'ilis
25
 and would present the Isma’ili doctrine to Avicenna but he explained that 
although he understood their position he did not accept it as the doctrine did not appeal to him. 
Once he was proficient in Hanafi jurisprudence
26
, his father sent him to study philosophy such as the 
works of Aristotle and more specifically the "Introduction"
27
 to Aristotle's "Categories" under the 
tutelage of Abu Abd Allah al-Natili. Avicenna was prodigy and stated in his biography that he 
mastered jurisprudence, logic, and philosophy. He also claimed that he had read the first five of 
Euclids’ theories before undertaking the solutions of the rest of the book himself. Despite his thirst 
for mastering academia, he was still deeply spiritual as he explained that when he would reach a 
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problem that puzzled him he would often visit the mosque to worship and pray to God, until God 
made what seemed difficult easy for him.  
Avicenna was also a keen herbalist and when the ruler of Bukhara had an illness for which the doctors 
were unable to find a cure, they called upon Avicenna who helped facilitate his treatment. Due to his 
success in treating the ruler of Bukhara he was recruited into the ruler’s service. Later in his life, after 
he was relieved from his position at the royal palace, the Prince Shams al-Dawla became ill and 
summoned Avicenna to his palace so that he could be treated. Avicenna was then appointed to the 
position of Prime Minister by Shams al-Dawla. Later, due to there being friction within the court, he 
was imprisoned by the army who pressured Shams al-Dawla to sentence him to death. Although 
Shams al-Dawala refused to carry out this punishment, in order to stop the internal disagreement he 
made Avicenna resign his position.
28
 Despite Avicenna resigning from his position he was later re- 
appointed as Prime Minister by prince Ala al-Dawla and he remained in that position until his death.
29
  
Despite Avicenna being in the service of the ruler of Bukara, he also lived through the reign of the 
infamous Muslim Caliph Qadir Billa. Qadir Billa was a staunch Hanbalite and as such was against 
the ideology of Avicenna, the Shia and the Hanafi Mutazalites in general due them holding positions 
that were the polar opposite to the Hanablites. It was the hatred of Qadr Billa which influenced the 
Ghazanawi kings who then wanted Avicenna killed.
30
 By the end of his reign Hanabli Islam which is 
considered Sunni Islam was in complete authority and all opposition to them namely the Hanafis and 
Shia had been completely subjugated. The greatest irony is that later in life Avicenna died of the same 
Colic illness
31
 that shot him to fame after he had cured it two times earlier, and had resulted in him gaining 
senior governmental positions. Although no one has theorised this presumption, it would not be too 
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farfetched to propose that there is a possibility that he was in fact killed by his opponents and the Colic 
Illness was merely used as an excuse.  
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Pre-eternity 
 
 
The subject of the pre-eternity of the universe is a very complex issue and has been discussed, debated 
and researched for a thousand years. We have philosophers and theologians who fall into three 
categories in terms of their opinion on the pre-eternity of the universe. The first category includes 
the philosophers who believed in the pre-eternity of the universe without the existence of a creator. 
The second category includes the philosophers who also argued in conformity with the idea of the 
pre-eternity of the universe but still believed that there was an eternal being who created the universe. 
The third category of thinkers believed that the universe was created out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo) 
by a creator. Despite many philosophers falling into one of the three categories mentioned above, 
some philosophers such as Galen argued that despite the strong arguments on both sides he is left to 
the fall-back position, namely that he is not sure whether the universe is pre-eternal or temporal.
32
 
The fact that Galen and many other philosophers held the position of being non-committal was 
commended by many later theologians such as Fakuruddin Razi who pointed out that he felt that 
Galen was an honest person whose sole goal was to find the truth, that his stance clarifies that this 
specific issue of the pre-eternity of the universe is extremely complicated, an area which many people 
have misunderstood or do not have the ability to comprehend the intricacies of the topic, despite 
them having a strong background in philosophy and theology
33
  Therefore, in this thesis we will 
explore each of the three ideas, we will analyse which previous philosophers, whether Greek, Islamic 
or contemporary held one of the three positions. We will also look at the view held by latter day 
orthodox Sunni scholars to see if they really did hold the position that the universe is temporal and 
it was created out of nothing as is being claimed by nearly all Muslim scholars in current times.  
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Aristotle and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
 
The first philosopher we will be exploring in this thesis is Aristotle. Aristotle is relevant to this thesis 
due to a number of reasons. Firstly, he held the position that the universe is eternal. We will see that 
there is a disagreement amongst philosophers such Avicenna and Al-Biruni about whether in his 
model of an eternal universe he believed in a creator. Another reason why his position must be 
explored is that an accusation that is levelled at Avicenna is that he is merely parroting the theory of 
Aristotle, as well as the allegation that Avicenna has committed the ‘crime’ of introducing Greek 
philosophy through the ideas of Aristotle into Islamic philosophy.  
According to Aristotle, metaphysics should present the strongest evidence, as it is the basis of all 
knowledge, and God should stand at the epicentre of the entire system. The origin of the argument 
supporting the position that the universe is eternal is from Aristotle. Before him the philosophers 
believed that the world came into being either out of nothing, or from primeval matter, or after a 
number of other worlds. Aristotle used a few arguments to demonstrate his position of the eternity 
of the cosmos, one of these arguments was change within the universe. Aristotle contends that there 
must be three aspects of all instances of change.
34
 Aristotle opposes Plato that the subject of change 
must be two opposite pairs of properties.
35
 The three aspects that Aristotle asserts are (I) an underlying 
subject, (II) a form, (III) a lack of that form. Aristotle provides the following argument with a similar 
example: 
 
A. A woman who never wrote became a writer 
B. A red jumper became worn and turned white 
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(http://www.logoslibrary.org/aristotle/physics/17.html), Book 1, Chapter 7. 
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In case (a), the subject is woman, the form is writer and the lack of that form is that she never wrote. 
In case (b), the subject is jumper, the form is whiteness and the lack of that form is redness. The 
subject the woman or the jumper, remains throughout the change. Of the other terms involved, the 
earlier ones which is that she never wrote or the redness cease to exist, while the later ones becoming 
a writer or turning white come into existence. Both of these are examples of something ‘coming’ into 
existence, since a lack of form is replaced by a form. So the whiteness exists and the redness no 
longer exists. Using this argument as a start point he posited that form and matter are eternal by the 
following argument
36
: The universe is a combination of matter and forms. Therefore, if God was to 
cause the creation of the universe, he would have to create matter and forms. But for Aristotle, as we 
have seen, for something to come into being requires the underlying subject upon which change 
occurs, the matter, as well as the form that has been created and later the annihilation of that form. 
Therefore, for there to be a creation of matter and forms, they must already exist, which is completely 
contradictory.  Thus one cannot postulate the contrary preposition that matter has been created in 
finite time, or out of nothing. As such based on this according to Aristotle the universe is eternal. 
Aristotle argues that the world cannot have been created out of nothing as there is no beginning. 
Everything that is, has come from another, and that thing came from something ad infinitum. A clear 
example of the viewpoint of Aristotle is his well-known response to Parmenides.
37
 His argument is 
that when something comes into being, that object exists. Parmenides then provides two explanations 
from where it has come from which is that it has come from what is or what is not. If the object that 
it comes from is something and what it becomes is the same thing, then no change has taken place 
and therefore one cannot say that it has become something. Alternatively, if the initial something is 
nothing, this is also impossible, because nothing can come to be out of nothing (ex nihilo nihil fit). 
Aristotle responds to Parmenides preposition that ‘something comes to be from what is or from what 
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is not’.38 Aristotle responds to this by proposing that the something that comes to be and what it comes 
from is both a being and a not-being. So in the argument of Parmenides the original and subsequent 
object are simple, being and not being. But as we have seen that according to Aristotle they are 
compounds.  So the initial object is something (in our example a woman) and it is not something (a 
writer). Aristotle obviously agrees with the second argument of Parmenides that nothing can come 
from nothing.
39
 But as Aristotle explains that he agrees with a caveat that something cannot come 
from nothing without a ‘qualification’. Aristotle clarifies that ‘we say that things come to be in a way—
for instance, coincidentally—from what is not. For something comes to be from the privation, which 
in itself is not and does not belong to the thing [when it has come to be].’40 What he means is that the 
writer is a product of a compound, a non-writer and a woman. Because according to Aristotle the 
initial state of not possessing the quality of a writer is in a way not being (as the quality of being a 
writer does not exist, but what does exist and something that is ignored by Parmenides is the woman. 
Therefore, one aspect of the compound exists (the woman) and one does not exist (the writer), that’s 
why Aristotle argues the Parmenides is both right and wrong.  
Avicenna stated in his letter to Al-Biruni which was a debate about eighteen issues, ten of which were 
related to points mentioned by Aristotle in his book ‘On the Heavens’ the following “And you should 
also know that when Aristotle said, «the universe has no beginning», he did not mean that the universe 
did not have a Creator; rather, he intended to exalt and protect the Creator from the charge of 
inaction”41 Therefore according to the information presented by Avicenna, Aristotle falls into the 
second category which the philosophers mentioned, which is that he believes in the pre-eternity of 
matter whilst still holding the position that there is a creator.
42
 Also, we know that Al-Biruni contends 
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that Aristotle believes in a creator. Now in this model proposed by Avicenna and attributed to 
Aristotle by Avicenna (which will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis), we find that he held 
that the Universe in eternal, and he rejects any possibility of it being temporal. He also argues that 
the creator is also eternal and that it is not possible for something temporal to come from something 
eternal. Further to this point and to be more specific, the main problem that they have with those 
that hold that the universe is temporal is that it means that one is applying time to God. That there 
was a time ‘before’ the creation where God was not creating, then after a period of time God decided 
to create the universe. Applying the terms before and after to God means that one is reducing God 
to the level of his creation, in this case the creation is time. Another problem that Avicenna had with 
this view point is that according to this it means that God had a change of intention. What is meant 
by this is that in the first instance God did not intend to create the universe and later he decided to 
create it. These contentions resulted in philosophers such as Avicenna and Aristotle arguing for the 
position of the universe being eternal. These arguments will be discussed in detail in the Avicenna 
section of the thesis. It is common for many people to misunderstand the position of Aristotle, for 
example according to Rhazes the position of the Greek philosophers and more specifically Aristotle 
is that there are two types of time; temporal time and pre-eternal time. Temporal time is the 
measurement of movement and bodies within the universe. Whereas pre-eternal time is infinite. 
According to Rhazes Aristotle believed that both types of time were infinite, but according to 
Avicenna this position had been incorrectly attributed to Aristotle. 
Aristotle in his book ‘On the Heavens’, in the first book, states that if one were to subtract a finite 
amount of time from a finite amount of time, you would left with a finite amount and that finite 
amount must have a beginning and end. Also, if there is a beginning time of a journey then there 
must also be a beginning for the movement and as such the beginning of the distance travelled. This 
principle according to Aristotle is applied universally.
43 Here Aristotle is claiming that time does have 
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a beginning, and because time is the measurement of the movement of matter then matter also has a 
beginning. Matter comes together to make up the universe and therefore its matter has a start point 
then conversely the universe must also have a start point. The problem with this statement of Aristotle 
is that it contradicts his popularised position of matter being pre-eternal. Latter philosophers such as 
Al-Biruni pointed out this contradiction of Aristotle when he stated that “And nothing caused the 
emergence of this objection except what has been accepted as a necessity of the limit of the motions 
and times from their initial beginnings. Aristotle himself admitted this fact when he was explaining 
impossibility of the existence of infinity. When he evaded elaboration on this topic, he merely 
followed his caprice.”44 
Aristotle argued that it is impossible that the universe could have been created temporally by a pre-
eternal creator.
45
 The premise of another of his arguments is that God is implementing a new ‘idea’. 
The theologians would argue that this is impossible for God. A change in God which in this case is 
God having a ‘new idea’ or making a ‘new decision’ would mean that there would be a material 
change in God. First there was no creation, then God ‘decided’ to create and then the universe came 
into existence. Aristotle argues that all changes are in an initial state of potentiality and for this 
potentiality to be enacted it requires someone to bring it in into effect. The basis of the argument for 
those who hold that the universe is pre-eternal relies on the eternity of time. According to the 
theologians God cannot be the simultaneous cause of time, because time means movement and that 
would mean that would be impossible as Gods existence cannot infer time since his eternal existence 
is not linked with time. What needs to be answered regarding this position is that this would then 
mean that since all causes infer time vis a vis there is no causal link between God and the Universe.  
Another proof of Aristotle which was highlighted by Al-Biruni in his exchange of letters with Avicenna 
was that he argued that the universe must have a beginning before it existed or on the other hand it 
must be eternal. Now if we have an object that moves, then before this movement there must have 
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been previous movement and as such a type of change, which means the previous beginning and 
ending before the current movement began after not moving. Now this current movement must have 
a state where there was an ability of being moved or for movement to be caused at its start point. On 
the other hand, the idea whether this object always existed without there being any motion is not a 
fruitful argument according to Aristotle. Therefore, if there wasn’t always movement then the object 
must have been in a state where it was possible for it to be moved so that there could be movement, 
and one of them must have been in the process of change.
46
 What Aristotle means by this and as he 
further elaborates is that if one thing is the double of the second when previously this was not the 
case, it would mean that one of them and possibly even both are in the process of change. This would 
mean that there would be a process of change which came before this and one which came before 
that.47 Al-Biruni would later argue that if we were to follow through on this argument of Aristotle it 
would mean that he was not a believer in God, as change cannot happen to God. Despite this theory 
of Aristotle having some weakness as explained by Al-Biruni, it is farfetched to surmise that he is not 
a believer of God. As we will see when we present the arguments of the opponent of Avicenna that 
one can come to a similar conclusion about their argument but it would not be pragmatic to state that 
they are not believers of God.  
Another argument for the pre-eternity of the universe is based on the idea of possibilities. Aristotle 
held the position whenever something is in the state of possibility that potentially is always realised 
and it comes into effect and by the same token the impossible never comes into reality. Therefore, 
if something eternal was possible it would certainly come into effect and as such cannot be possible 
but instead necessary and if it did not come into effect then it would be something that is impossible 
rather than possible.
48
 The premise of his argument is that possibility is not possible when exploring 
pre-eternity, because either it is impossible or it necessary, but for the temporal something can be 
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possible, impossible or necessary.
49
 The Asharis hold that everything is possible for God, despite God 
according to their ontology being eternal. We will explore this further when we analyse the position 
of latter Muslim philosophers and theologians.  
Aristotle’s arguments for the pre-eternity of the universe are multi-layered as he first deals with the 
issue by explaining why he believes in the pre-eternity of the universe and he later moves onto 
explaining the weaknesses in the arguments of those who believe in a temporal world. Despite there 
being a disagreement between Avicenna and Al-Biruni regarding whether he believes in a creator 
whilst also believing in the eternity of the universe, the fact that he comments that he believes in a 
creator in his other works, would means that we can place Aristotle in the category of philosophers 
who believe in an eternal world whilst still believing in a creator.  
 
 
Philo of Alexandria and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
 
Critolaus was a Greek philosopher born on 118CE who came from Phaselis.
50
 He was a follower of 
the Peripatetic school.
51
 None of his writings have survived, but many of his positions and ideas can 
be found in other writings such as the work of Philo of Alexandria ‘On the Eternity of the World’.52 
He was a follower of the Aristotelian position on the eternity of the world and like many philosophers 
who held this position he wrote against the Stoics who held that that world is temporal. The 
Peripatetics used a number of well-known arguments such as ‘if the world has come to be, it is 
necessary that the earth too has come to be; if the earth is subject to coming-to-be, certainly the human 
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race [will be so too]; but man is not subject to coming-to-be, since the race has existed from eternity, 
as will be shown. So the world too is eternal.’’53 Or another argument of Critolaus which was simplistic 
in its nature was ‘what is the cause of its own health does not suffer disease. What is the cause of its 
own wakefulness, too, does not sleep. But if this is so, what is the cause of its own existence is eternal. 
But the world is the cause of its own existence, if it is the cause [of the existence] of all other things. 
So the world is eternal.”’54  
The result of this argument is that if the universe is eternal then there are an infinite number of causes 
and vis a vis an infinite number of effects, it means there will be an infinite number of chicken and 
eggs and in this argument it will not result in there being a first cause, which for followers of the 
Abrahamic religions is God. Although for Aristotle in the eternal world, causes are finite as well as 
effects, despite his model of the universe being eternal. He believes that it isn’t possible that 
movement could have started or can continue on its own. Avicenna’s counter argument to those who 
believe in an eternal world without a first cause is that, this is only the case when you apply space and 
time to God. If time is not applied to God then under his proposition there is an eternal universe 
and there is an eternal God on whom time cannot be applied. That he is the creator of the universe 
and it is from him that world emanates eternally. The position of emanation that forms the main 
basis of the argument of Avicenna states that an eternal God that cannot be changed, is linked to an 
eternal universe that is the subject of change, with God being the cause of the world. On the other 
hand those who argued against this position proposed that if there is causal link between an eternal 
God and the eternal universe, then no preceding movement can be the cause of movement that 
comes after, and this would continue ad infinitum, for example the sequences of father and sons 
would result in infinite regress.
55
 Whereas in the position of Avicenna God is not the first cause, but 
instead God is the continuous cause of everything.  
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Proculus of Alexandria and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Proculus was located in the Roman Empire during the third century and he was reported to have 
died on 281 AD. Proculus was a supporter of the notion of the pre-eternity of the universe. The 
books that have been written by Proclus are lost but what we do have is the book of John Philoponus 
who reproduced the arguments of Proculus in order to refute them so that he could put forward his 
position of the temporal nature of the universe. It was the translation of his ideas which were 
produced in Arabic
56
 that were later used and developed by Muslim philosophers to form their 
position of the pre-eternity of the universe with an eternal God, based on the theory of emanation.
57
 
His argument was on the basis of the idea of applying time to an eternal being (God). He contended 
that this would mean that at a specific point in time it was the first point of creation, meaning that 
there was a time when God was not creating and as such at that time he was not a creator, then after 
this came a time when God was creating and thus at this time he became a creator.
58
 This would mean 
that there was a change in God and if there was a change, then in its very nature change only occurs 
in temporal entities.
59
 A problem with this idea is that if one accepts that there was a first instance of 
movement when the universe began to move, and there was no movement before this point then 
there would have been a time when there was no matter, as time is merely the measurement of the 
movement of matter. Therefore, to argue that there was a time when there was no matter, means that 
there was a time when there was no time which is contradictory and therefore impossible.
60
 The most 
important idea of this position is that if there is a first instance of creation then there is a time before 
this where God is not creating or time before this where there is no matter. Those who disagreed 
with this position and advocated the eternal nature of the universe argued that using the term ‘before’ 
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or ‘preceding’ does not point to there being time before the first instance of creation, as time was also 
created in the first instance of creation with the rest of the universe. They argued that what this means 
is that God is prior to the world in his essence but not prior to in terms of time such as how a cause 
is prior to an effect.
61
 Avicenna’s example to explain his own model of the universe is where he states 
that there is an eternal God and there is an eternal universe, but the former is the cause of the latter, 
such as where a person turns a key and a lock opens. The key turning and the hand turning occur 
together in their essence but the hand is the cause of the key. 
 
 
John Philoponus and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
John Philoponus was a Neoplatonist Christian theologian from the sixth century who believed in the 
temporality of the universe. Many of his arguments were later reproduced by Ghazali and latter 
Ashari scholars. According to Philoponus and as such Ghazali and other Asharis, in his sixteenth 
argument he stated that it is imperative that one differentiates between God eternally willing things 
into existence and his eternal will being applied onto things.  For example, it is not in the nature of 
Sir Isaac Newton to exist before Albert Einstein, but instead before Einstein existed God had willed 
that Newton should come into existence. He willed for this to occur in eternity so that when the time 
came for Newton to be born he came into existence. He argued that when one says that God ‘came 
before’ it was not in time.62 Averroes argues that the argument of Philoponus and Ghazali is flawed 
as there is a difference between willing something and actually doing it. You can make the decision 
that you will drive your car tomorrow but the actual willing to drive the car can only occur in the exact 
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moment you actually do it, and there cannot be any delay between the cause and effect. The decision 
of driving the car is not enough but you also require that this is coupled with the act of actually driving 
the car being performed. Therefore, this would mean that for God there would have to be a ‘new’ 
act to create and it is this change that is impossible for God. Averroes also argues that an additional 
flaw of the argument of Ghazali and Philoponus is that it reduces the will of God to that of a will of a 
human. Desire and will are only present in a being that has a need and God does not have any need 
or choice for when God acts, he always creates the best possible thing. The will of God is different 
to the will of a human. 
The position that was stated above by Philoponus was as a response to his detractors. But he 
presented some potent points against those who support the pre-eternity of the universe. He stated 
that an eternal universe would mean that something that is eternal has come into existence and which 
contradicts the very nature of an eternal. It would also mean that we would have different types of 
eternals of different sizes and types.
63
 One of the arguments has been presented by Simplicius
64
 and 
it relies on three premises. The first is that for something to exist it requires that something else before 
it and if the thing that came before did not exist then the resulting thing cannot also exist.
65
 The second 
is that a number itself cannot be infinite, it cannot be changed, moved nor can it increase.
66
 The third 
is that something cannot come into existence if its existence requires the existence of an infinite 
number of other things, where these things come from one another. This results in the idea that a 
temporally infinite universe with a successive causal chain is impossible. It would mean that if the 
universe was eternal there would be a number of different types of infinites and these infinites could 
increase.
67
 For example, the planets have different periods of orbits and the various planets in a variety 
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of years have a different number of orbits, some that are larger than others.
68
 The assumption that is 
made regarding their motion throughout eternity would mean that infinity can increase which is 
against the Aristotelian position that numbers cannot be infinite.
69
 
Some of the arguments of Philoponus were developed from the positions presented by St Augustine, 
a Christian philosopher from the fourth century. For example, St Augustine argues in his book De 
Civilate Dei that God is eternal and that after a certain period of time, without their being a change 
in his will, he created the universe, something he did not wish to create before his decision to create 
at that point. This is quite relevant, and a strong argument can be made that just as some of the 
arguments of Philoponus are taken from St Augustine, similarly some of the arguments of al-Ghazali 
were taken from John Philoponus. For example, an important feature to remember about St 
Augustine is that like Ghazali and John Philoponus he argued that God coming before does not refer 
to being ‘before’ in time.70 Therefore we find that John Philoponus, as well as St Augustine fall into 
the third category, which are the philosophers who believe in a God who created a temporal universe 
at a specific point in time.  
 
 
Al-Maturidi and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Abu Mansoor al-Maturidi was a Hanafi scholar who was born in the village of Maturidi in the region 
of Samarqand in Uzbekistan. He was born around 852
71
  most scholars agree that he died 944. He is 
the founder of one of the major orthodox Sunni schools which followed the doctrine of Imam Abu 
Hanifa. To describe al-Maturidi as a ‘follower’ of Abu Hanifa would be a gross oversimplification as 
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he introduced, developed and systemised Maturidi theology to the Muslim world. The theological 
issues that were prevalent during the time of Avicenna were also being dealt with by al-Maturidi a 
century earlier, examples of this can be seen through their works such as the both of them refuting 
the positions of al-Kaabi a prominent Mutazalite scholar. The theological and philosophical 
methodology of al-Maturidi lends towards a rational approach. This can be seen by the fact that in 
his arguments he does not use the hadith tradition as proof for his position, which is a process that 
was used by many of his peers as well as his predecessors. Further, in his book Kitaab at-Tawheed, 
he only uses only a small amount of proof from the Quran to prove his position, although this can 
be counter balanced by the fact that he has written a detailed commentary on the Quran which is 
called Ta’wilat Ahl As Sunnah. What makes the position of al-Maturidi all the more relevant when 
speaking about Avicenna is that through the detailed reading and analysis of both classical 
personalities, their positions on a variety of issues do not differ. What makes it even more interesting 
is that is that in this issue one may argue that Avicenna was following the methodology of al-Maturidi 
more than anyone else, as he took it upon himself to ensure that he did not anthropomorphise God 
by applying time to him. Despite the both of them holding similar views one became the founding 
father of Sunni theology whilst the other was discarded and rejected, considered a heretic to the 
extent that it was not deemed appropriate to teach his works within the realm of Islamic learning.  
Al-Maturidi used both texts (Nasus) as well as rational proofs to form his theological and 
philosophical arguments in his books Kitaab At-Tawheed and Tawilat Ahl as-Sunna. An important 
point to note is that when al-Maturidi presents his argument he is not attempting to refute the 
philosophers such as Aristotle. He was also born a century before Avicenna and therefore his 
arguments had not been produced at the point of his writing. Avicennas’ sole purpose for writing his 
position was to prove the existence of God. He did this by attempting to prove that the universe is 
eternal. Al-Maturidi held the position that the universe was temporal, that it was created by God but 
he does not deal with the ideas that were discussed by Avicenna and al-Ghazali, such as God creating 
the universe at a specific point in time and what the result of this would be if this idea is applied to 
God. Al-Maturidi leans heavily on rational proofs but does not ignore Quranic textual proofs to form 
41 
 
his arguments. Therefore as proof against the pre-eternity of the universe he used the Quranic verses: 
“God is the Creator of all things, and He is in Charge of all things”72 “Originator of the heavens and 
the earth. Whenever He decrees a thing, He says to it, “Be,” and it becomes.”73 “Originator of the 
heavens and the earth—how can He have a son when He never had a companion? He created all 
things, and He has knowledge of all things.”74 “To God belongs the sovereignty of the heavens and 
the earth. God has power over all things.”75 “In fact, you are humans from among those He created. 
He forgives whom He wills, and He punishes whom He wills. To God belongs the dominion of the 
heavens and the earth and what lies between them, and to Him is the return.”76  
Al-Maturidi presented his own argument by making a distinction between the substance and 
accidental. He said that movement and stillness, durability and destruction, amalgamation and 
separation are all accidentals which are different to substances. We know through our own 
observations that movement follows stillness, and that amalgamation follows separation and that 
something coming into existence follows non-existence. These ‘accidentals’ cannot be the same as 
the main body which is the ‘substance’, because if it was the same then the substance would not be 
able to hold the two opposing qualities such as movement and stillness. Therefore, this clearly shows 
that the substance and accidental are two very different things.
77
 Due to these opposites not being able 
to be together, there is a succession such as from stillness to movement, which shows that these 
accidentals are temporary.
78
  Al-Maturidi also argued that based on our senses we can observe that 
the universe is not eternal, because we see that matter depends on being a substance and is dependent 
on accidentals for its existence. Eternity is not dependent on anything because by its nature it must 
be independent, therefore the universe cannot be eternal.
79
 Al-Maturidi argues that since matter has 
these opposite natures, there must be an external force that brings all of these parts together. As 
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matter relies on something external it must thus be of a temporary nature.
80
 He also argued that the 
finite nature of substances which we observe proves the finite nature of the universe itself. We know 
the world consists of these finite objects as we see that they come into existence after not existing so 
they are also temporal in terms of time. Therefore, the universe has substances that are finite and it 
is not possible to have objects which are temporal and infinite together.
81
  
The most potent of al-Maturidis arguments against the pre-eternity of the universe is based on the 
accidentals of motion and stillness being temporary. Al-Maturidi explained that it not possible for 
matter to have neither motion nor stillness, one of these attributes must exist at one time, which 
means that at least one of them must be temporary, and as they rely on one another then the other 
accidental must also be temporary.
82
 Another of his main arguments is regarding the nature of the 
world and that there can be the following possibilities: One can either make the proposition that the 
world is still eternal despite accidentals such as movement and stillness, durability and destruction, 
amalgamation and separation which are all temporary accidentals as explained earlier. If this is the 
case, then the entire universe must be temporal because anything that relies on the temporal must 
itself be temporal. If the World is then temporal then it cannot be eternal. If this is not the case, then 
the Universe is not relying on any of these temporal qualities and therefore its origination must be 
from something that is not temporal. The alternative is that initially the Universe did not possess 
these accidental qualities but later they came into existence. It is within this statement that you can 
find the views of those who believe in the pre-eternity of the universe. We will explore these opinions 
later in the thesis but it is important to understand the argument of Avicenna doesn’t reside in this 
proposition, as we will see when we tackle his ideas. A point to note is that al-Maturidi obviously lived 
before Avicenna and therefore did not comment on the specifics of the argument of Avicenna. 
Another of the arguments of al-Maturidi is regarding cause and effect. He proposed that just as all 
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effects must have a cause then the universe must also have a cause and in terms of the universe the 
cause of it is God.
83
  
Al-Maturidi continued that another proof for the temporal nature of the universe is the possibility of 
life existing in the dead, because it has life after not existing, and it is now living after once having the 
possibility of life within it. It proves that the things that have life are temporal just as those things that 
have death, as things move form life to death, which demonstrates its temporal nature.  
Al-Maturidi used his arguments for the temporal nature of the universe as one of his proofs for the 
existence of God. Proofs for the existence of God are not relevant to the purposes of this thesis as 
this dissertation is more specific and about the argument for and against the pre-eternity of the 
universe. In addition, the conflict between al-Ghazali and Avicenna is not about the existence of God, 
as they both agree that there is a creator but instead their disagreement is specifically about the pre-
eternity of the universe.  
Al-Maturidi opposed the position of the pre-eternity of the universe and strongly espoused the 
position of there being a temporal world and there being an unoriginated creator of the Universe. 
The main basis of the arguments of al-Maturidi are based on the notion that that substances must 
always hold temporal qualities and is therefore temporal in nature. Al-Maturidis argued that the 
arguments of the advocates of the pre-eternity of the universe during his time, can be summarised 
into three succinct arguments. His first argument is that those who support the pre-eternity of the 
universe do so out of blindly following the arguments of their predecessors – that they merely follow 
those who came before them without making an attempt to analyse or understand the rationale 
behind the arguments. Al-Maturidi argued that it is a hopeless endeavour to debate with these types 
of people and that one should not waste ones’ time engaging with these people.84  Al-Maturidi explains 
that their second argument is regarding cause and effect, that it is impossible for something to come 
out of nothing. That everything that there is, comes from something else, which comes from another 
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ad infinitum and that this is the makeup of the eternal structure of the universe.
85
  That the universe 
cannot have an originator which is external to the world as it is something that cannot be recognised 
by the senses or understood by the intellect.
86
  The third argument of those who support the pre-
eternity of the universe during the time of al-Maturidi was the argument of the Dualists. They held 
that there were two originators of the universe, that good and evil which are diametrically opposite 
and cannot be from the same entity, so that one of these gods is the originator of all things that are 
good in the universe and the other god is responsible for everything that is evil in the universe. They 
considered it to be impossible for a good and merciful God to be responsible for all of the evil and 
destruction in the world.
87
 Al-Maturidi explained that the position of the Dualists gives them a stronger 
right to believing in the pre-eternity of the universe. This is as they believe that evil and good or 
darkness and light are two separate entities which amalgamated together so that the universe came 
into existence, as we know that when things are mixed and come together they are temporal in nature, 
because before they were mixed together they were unmixed and when they were not mixed they 
were not what we call the universe. Unless they say that light and darkness are two separate entities 
that were confused from their original state but they were initially in their own place.  In the place of 
light all of it was good and in the place of darkness all of it was darkness and evil. This rejects the 
belief in the pre-eternity of the universe which includes that these entities were mixed together. It also 
refutes the pre-eternity of the mixed universe especially the statement of al-Mani where he says when 
the light was in the presence of the darkness and the darkness was scratching it and mixing into it, so 
the light created this universe to separate itself from the darkness, so this universe according to this 
statement came into existence after these two entities mixed together, which means that according to 
them the temporal came into being after a pre-eternal accident. This idea is irrational according to 
al-Maturidi because their position necessitates disability of light at the peak of its strength when it was 
with all of its soldiers and all of its good but was not able to defend itself from the darkness forcing 
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itself into it. It necessitates the ignorance of the light when the strength of the darkness forced itself 
onto it so that it was unable to escape from it, and that it then created the universe due to its inability 
to defend itself from the strength of the darkness. This idea according to al-Matuiridi is theologically 
absurd.
88
 In terms of the Dualists, not all of them held the same view and there were a number of 
different positions held by the various groups of Dualists. An example of this is Thanawees who 
disagreed on what is meant by the two entities merging together. They disagreed whether this merging 
occurred naturally or it was a deliberate act by the darkness.
89
 
Al-Maturidi attributed the arguments that would later be found in the works of Avicenna to the 
Bataniyya group. He explained that those who propose this argument hold that the universe is eternal 
but that the universe also has a creator, that these Muslim philosophers classify God as the perfect 
cause and that the universe is the necessary effect of this perfect cause. And that it is not possible for 
there to be an effect without a cause and vis a vis a cause without an effect. Therefore, if the cause, 
which in the case of Avicenna is God, is eternal then the effect must also be eternal. 
Al-Maturidi did not accept the notion that when there is a cause then there must be an effect when it 
related to God, as it would mean that God would be forced to create and it impossible for God to be 
forced to create, because if the creator is forced then it is not possible for him to be the originator of 
the universe.  
What is accepted by both sides is that the universe was created and that the universe is comprised of 
a variety of fundamentals. The one who creates this universe cannot be forced into doing so, that the 
nature of the universe is such that it is not controlled by the laws of cause and effect such that God is 
the necessary cause. But al-Maturidi clarifies that what he means by this is that if his opponents state 
that God creates the world without being forced to do so then calling him the causer (without choice) 
is inaccurate.
90
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The naturalists hold the position that the world is made up of the four elements: fire, earth, air and 
water. These elements are mixed to form all aspects of the universe. Although there are some 
naturalists who consider one of these elements as the building block of the universe. Similar to the 
previous argument, al-Maturidi argues that their position is flawed for the following reasons; these 
elements are naturally caused and are forced to act based on that which is naturally caused. According 
to the naturalists other than that which has been naturally caused by these elements, everything else 
can increase or decrease or be reduced to neutral and therefore these elements cannot be the cause 
of the universe but instead there must be a creator who is not forced to act based on the natural laws 
of the universe.
91
  The naturally caused elements will only effect those things that they are naturally 
built to effect and therefore will not affect those things that it is not in their nature to effect, due to 
this there cannot be things that have been affected but there is no cause, thus there must be someone 
who combines the effect of the natural and non-natural cause, and the combiner of these two aspects 
is God.
92
 
Al-Maturidi explains that Aristotle was Ashab al-Hayula, who holds the position that the entire 
universe came from prime matter (Hayula), which is matter without size or shape, it is neither 
accidental nor substance, and it has no qualities and is infinite in quantity. All of the fundamental 
building blocks in the Universe, which includes all substances and their accidentals, all types of 
change, cause and effect, are caused by this dormant power (Quwwa) which comes from the nature 
of the prime matter.
93
 Al-Maturidi identified a number of problems with the beliefs of the Ashab al-
Hayula, firstly that the world cannot be eternal because it is produced through changes that occur 
due to the latent power (Quwwa) in this prime matter (Hayula). If this change occurs and the prime 
matter which is eternal changes to this universe, then the prime matter no longer exists and instead it 
has changed to this world which is instead temporal. This contradicts the basis of the position held 
by Aristotle that a pre-eternal cause cannot create a temporal world but in this case the philosophers 
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have in the end produced the same argument and replaced God with prime matter. Another problem 
according to al-Maturidi is that if the prime matter (Hayula) is without size or shape then how can 
accidents occur within it? According to the Ashab al-Hayula, the latent power (Quwwa) changes the 
nature of the prime matter (Hayula) and therefore there should be no time where they are separate 
from one another. Al-Maturidi argues that what this means is that the world was produced at a specific 
time even in the case of the pre-eternity of the world, it means that the Quwwa is not caused naturally 
but instead it must have free choice. If the Hayula had these qualities which were innate to it then it 
would be a contradiction as it would then be without shape, size or character but still have these 
qualities. But if they were to maintain that the Huyla does not have any of these characteristics, then 
it means that what it produces will not be due to the prime matter nor the latent power as both of 
these do not have any of the characteristics. Due to this there must be an outside force which made 
these qualities come into existence.
94
 
As Maturidi explained earlier that if the universe has come from the Hayula then they would be from 
the same substances and therefore as this world is temporal then it would mean the prime matter 
must also be temporal. If the prime matter is not related to this universe but the world is still as a 
result of it, then it gives the following possibilities for its conception: Firstly, it could be that there are 
some qualities within the prime matter which change its substance from a sizeless, shapeless entity to 
the entity that we see in this world which is temporal and has the ability to change. In this instance 
the Hayula no longer exists and is instead replaced by this world which allegedly has been created by 
something which is external to them.
95
 Or the second alternative is that this universe had a dormant 
existence within the prime matter and it later comes into existence. Al-Maturidi rejected this notion 
as he stated that the Hayula has does not have intelligence and therefore it does not have the control 
or will to bring itself into existence.
96
 The third possibility is that they believe that the Hayula brings 
the universe into existence after previously not existing by its own free will. If this is the argument, 
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then al-Maturidi postulates that the only difference between this and his own belief is that his name 
for prime matter is Allah whereas his opponents name it Hayula.97 
Another group of philosophers held that the changes in the universe are as a result of the eternal 
movement of the stars. Al-Maturidi opposed this opinion by presenting the alternative idea that all 
forms of movement have a beginning and an end. That the start of every movement is the end of 
previous movement and it is not possible to have an end of a movement without there being a 
beginning and therefore if the movement has such a temporal nature it cannot be eternal.
98
  
Al-Maturidi links this argument to his previous contentions that stars move in a circular motion, and 
so suppose that this circular path was made into a linear path it would mean the end of one motion 
would be the beginning of a different motion. If you were to contend that the universe is eternal, then 
it would mean that these movements would have both an existence and non-existence which is 
eternal, and this would result in an impossibility. Therefore, these movements must have a start 
point.
99
 Al-Maturidi continues by saying that if two objects both move in a straight line and one of 
these objects is in front of the other, the reason for this is either that one of these objects started 
before the other, or the two objects are moving at different speeds, or the two objects have different 
start points, and that these possibilities prove that movements have a beginning.
100
 He continues that 
the perpetual movement of the stars shows that this occurs as a result of an external force, otherwise 
they themselves would have chosen a less complicated method of controlling the universe and the 
origin and complexities of the universe cannot be the result of a self-determination.
101
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Avicenna and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
In order to judge the position of Avicenna, it must be analysed by variety of angles, the first being his 
position, then how his ideas relate to his predecessors such as Aristotle, why his ideas were refuted 
by Ghazali such that he was considered a disbeliever as his position was considered to have traversed 
the boundaries of accepted Islamic scholarship, and then finally was his position truly rejected or 
were the blueprint of his ideas about the pre-eternity of matter held by both Islamic and non-Islamic 
scholars who came after him. 
In order to understand the negativity towards Avicenna, one needs to look into his background and 
theology and how this correlated with the rulers of that time. Avicenna was an Islamic scholar who 
was Hanafi in his jurisprudence. In theology, his ideas were more closely matching the Maturidi and 
Mutazalite School, the latter was considered a heretical school by the rulers who were Hanbalites. 
The main conflict between these two parties was theological - their understanding of God. The 
Hanbalites were anthropomorphist in nature whereas the Maturidi and Mutazalite were not and 
rejected any notion of applying physicality to God. This resulted in battles between the two parties 
and a shift in power from a Mutazalite leader to a Hanbalite leader resulted in the persecution of tens 
of thousands of Hanafis (who were Mutazalite and Maturidi in theology). This historical background 
is relevant to Avicenna in so far as he opposed the Hanbalites politically as well as theologically. 
Avicenna in his philosophy was the polar opposite of the Hanbalites even more so than the Maturidis 
and Mutazalites. It meant his idea of metaphysics and more specifically the pre-eternity of the World 
was rejected by Muslims and considered heretical.  We have read a more detailed account of this in 
the introduction as well as the biography of Avicenna earlier in the thesis.  
Avicenna took it upon himself to analyse and where it was needed refute those theologians and 
philosophers who attempted to refute Aristotle and this was especially the case for arguments that he 
also held to be true. For example Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya al-Razi better known as by 
his Latin name Rhazes from the tenth century was known for his criticism of Aristotle. When 
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speaking about the issue of pre-eternal time and temporal time, Avicenna claimed that Razi 
incorrectly attributed this position to Aristotle when in fact Aristotle held a different position when 
referring to time, as we explained earlier.
102
  
Before speaking about the pre-eternity of the universe, Avicenna defines the specific terminologies 
that he will be using in the text that follows. Therefore, any definition that precedes this must be 
based on the model of the world that is defined based on the definition provided by the writer. 
Avicenna defines ‘sunan’ (creation) using the following explanation – “Creation according to the 
philosophers is referring to something which has to do with the possible things and does not have 
time or matter preceding it.”103 When Muslim philosophers use the term Ibdaa they mean the 
possibility, which is not similar to the explanation provided by Avicenna, which is that it is something 
which does not have time or matter preceding it. So, before he begins explaining the per-eternity of 
matter, which is creation, he defines what he means by creation. Therefore, it is un-academic to apply 
the definition of other philosophers on the explanation of Avicenna. This definition of Avicenna is 
clearly showing that he does not view God and creation as the same eternal entity. Instead, for 
Avicenna creation is something that is possible which means that it may or may not exist, whereas 
God is necessary as he must exist.
104
 Also for Avicenna creation is something that does not have time 
or matter preceding it, which means that there cannot be time before creation as both it and time are 
created entities, as well as the fact that once there is matter, meaning creation, that is when there is 
time, as time is merely the measurement of the movement of matter. Therefore, we cannot have time 
before creation.
105
 This definition clearly would negate the position of those who attempt to refute 
Avicenna by calling him a heretic and a disbeliever. But we will continue looking at the arguments 
presented by Avicenna and his opponents in more detail.  
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Looking at the definition of creation according to Avicenna we know that something that is 
ontologically possible may or may not exist. Anything that has a possibility of existence or non-
existence cannot be God.
 106
  The Asharis and Maturidis explain that what is meant by something 
being possible is that it has the possibility of God bringing it into existence. Avicenna makes a 
distinction that the possibility of existence does not necessarily mean that it is under the Will of God, 
as such the possibility of something coming into existence is not something that comes after Will, but 
instead it is something that comes after non-existence. Avicenna is attempting to try to refute the 
position of the later Asharis and Maturidis on this issue.  This would mean that it is not possible 
within itself as its existence depends on another and we understand that something that is created out 
of nothing relies on something to bring it into existence. The existence of any eternal being must be 
wajib (necessary). In the ontology of Avicenna, God is the only Necessary existent (Wajib al-Wajud), 
therefore God doesn’t come into existence by something else nor does he require this external agent 
to keep him in existence.
107
 The second aspect of the point is that creation is something that does 
have time or matter preceding it. Avicenna’s point is that creation is something that does not have 
time or matter before it. This means that there is no creation before time, therefore the only way this 
would be tantamount to disbelief is if one believes that time and matter are applicable on God. God 
is not bound by time, the term ‘before’ is a construct of time because in time ‘before’ precedes the 
present and the future. Thus, applying the term ‘before’ to God is actually a statement of disbelief.108 
In terms of Avicenna’s opinion about pre-eternity, as demonstrated, he explained the terminology 
and the definition of the term, so based on this definition the statement of disbelief in Islam made 
by Imam Ghazali misses the mark, although this misunderstanding of Avicennas’ view is common 
amongst Muslim theologians and orientalists and is most likely due to the complex nature of his 
argument.
109
 He has a tendency to give his own definitions of things earlier in his writings and then 
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expects the reader to have read, understood and to be able to apply these definitions when reading 
him later.  
Avicenna explains that the lay person generally holds the position (and later we would find that it was 
a view held by al-Ghazali and many other Asharis) that we have something called the effect and 
another thing we call the agent. The agent is the one doing the act and bringing something to 
existence, shaping and causing it. The effect is the thing that receives the act from the agent, as such 
it came into existence and has been shaped and constructed. What this means is that something came 
into existence due to another, after not existing.
110
 What makes this interesting is that according to 
Avicenna, this is basic position held by the lay person without giving the matter any in-depth thought. 
He is dismissing it as a basic understanding, although this was not an attempted slight by him about 
his detractors and especially al-Ghazali. This is because al-Ghazali as well as many of the vocal 
opponents of this position came later. His debate with Alberonius on the issue did not cover the issue 
that deeply.  
Avicenna then pointed out that there is a position held by some that once the thing is brought into 
existence there is no longer a need for the agent. For example, imagine a building that has been built 
by a builder. Once constructed the building is no longer in need of the builder, despite the fact that 
one would be able to see the effect of the builder on the building. Similarly, the universe would only 
be in need of a creator to bring it into existence after previously not existing. There would not be a 
need for the creator once the universe was created. This would then bring forth the question that if 
everything that exists needs something else to bring it into existence, then the same can be said of the 
creator and so on which would continue and result in infinite regress.
111
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The meaning of something not having a necessary existence by its essence but through something 
else does not contradict due to two reasons.
112
 The first is having necessary existence by something 
else all the time or necessary existence by something else temporarily. Necessary existence by 
something else could meet them in both ways, and it will contradict having necessary existence by 
itself, unless something external has an effect on it and anything which came into being after not 
existing has only one of the two ways which is more specific that the second meaning. Both of these 
meanings are caused by that connection that occurs due to something else. Therefore, as long as one 
of the two meanings are more general than the second, then the meaning is related to both of them. 
This is because initially the meaning is related to the one that is general by itself and for the more 
specific as secondary, as the meaning is not connected to the more specific after being connected to 
the more general, without it being connected the other way around. Even though if it didn’t come 
after not existing but it will it will result in it existing by something else. Which would be possible by 
itself, but that connection would not be innate, as such it clarifies that this connection is due to some 
other reason. Although this argument from Avicenna is quite lengthy it is necessary to understanding 
the basis of his argument regarding the pre-eternity of the universe. The reason for this is that this 
attribute is infinitely causing its effect and not only while it is affecting, that’s why this connection will 
be all of the time. Also, if it would be the case that it came after not existing then it does not mean 
that the connection happened after only coming from not existing which would then mean that after 
that there would be no need for an agent.
 113
 
Avicenna explained that which begins to exist after not existing has a ‘before’ in which it did not exist. 
But this concept of being ‘before’ is not based on time such as the number one being before the 
number two. So it is not that one has to come ‘before’ or ‘after’ the other but instead it is the concept 
of before by which after cannot exist. This concept of ‘before’ is not due to non-existence because 
non-existence can come ‘after’. Also, it is not the essence of the agent itself because the agent can also 
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be before, during or after - it is something different in which the issue of renewing and extinction will 
continue to happen continuously.
114
 Thus, this type of sequence and continuity which is similar to 
movement in terms of continuity, cannot be composed except for non-divisible parts
115
  
Avicenna continues that something cannot be renewed or enacted unless there is a material and real 
change of status, because before when there was no change there was no creation and something has 
to have changed for there now to be a different effect. It is impossible for this change of status to 
occur unless there is a potential ability for the status to be changed. Therefore, the connection 
between the two is between the connection of movement with the moving subject, and to be more 
specific the change that is occurring and subject upon which change is being applied, especially if the 
two cannot be connected or disconnected as this will result in a circular argument. This connection 
must meet the measurement because if it came before it could have been considerably earlier or it 
could have been just before the current time.
116
 Therefore there can be a large difference in the 
measurement when it happened ‘before’ as well as there can be a difference in the thing that can be 
measured and as such it can be changed. What is being explained in terms of the quantity of 
measurement is in fact time. But this time cannot be in terms of using the terminology of ‘before’ or 
‘after’, what we can see is that for one to oppose the explanation of Avicenna you would have to admit 
that time is applicable to God.
117
  
At times Avicenna can be deeply philosophical and quite dry in his writings to the point where many 
people who read him can misunderstand his point when it comes to the issue of God and his relation 
to creation, he ensures at many point in his writings that there is a distinction. For example, he states 
that “It is well known and understood that anything that comes into existence from nothing is due to 
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the First mind”.118 By the First mind he means God and his knowledge and what he is alluding to is 
that when it comes to the creation it is up to the Will and decision of God regarding whether he gives 
priority to one of the two sides in terms of whether he brings something into existence or leaves it as 
not existing.  It means that God holds the position of superiority according to Avicenna and as such 
when he is stating that the universe is eternal he is not stating that there is some sort of equality or 
similarity between God and the universe. He explains that the universe comes into existence due to 
holding necessary or possible existence.
119
 If it comes from something whose existence is possible as 
opposed to being necessary, then we have to look for another reason that is actually necessary and 
that is impossible as it will result in infinite regress because we know that the reason for the existence 
is something that is compulsory.
120
 
Avicenna relays the following position in Isharaat pertaining to the relationship between the cause 
(God) and the effect (universe). He explained that as long as the cause exists as a cause, then the 
effect should also exist, as the effect is related to the cause and the relationship between the two is 
based on the cause being in such a way that it will be caused
121
 (in which it produces ‘something’ or it 
effects something to ‘happen’) and this can happen either naturally or by choice122 or by some other 
means.
123
 What Avicenna means here is that when we see that a cause has resulted in an effect, this 
can happen in three ways. The first is that it can happen naturally without there being an intention of 
someone to bring it in affect. For example, those who do not believe in a creator who argue that the 
universe came into existence naturally without there being the intention of a creator to bring it into 
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existence. The ‘Big Bang’ happened naturally and this resulted in the expansion of the universe but 
no one caused this ‘Big Bang’ instead it happened naturally. The second option is that it happened 
by choice which mean that the cause resulted in the effect due to the choice something that wanted 
this to happen. For example, a snooker player choosing to use the white ball to hit the red ball. This 
doesn’t happen naturally where the white ball automatically hits the red ball, but instead this happens 
due to the choice of the snooker player who chooses to use the white ball to hit the red ball. Avicenna 
continues his explanation by stating that this cause must be external to the effect, which means that it 
should not be related to the effect in such a manner that it makes the cause occur naturally. Avicenna 
provides an explanation for this to show how the cause must be external, so that it cannot occur 
naturally without there being a choice of something external such as in terms of equipment. For 
example a carpenter needs something external such as axe, it is this choice of using the axe on the 
material which shows that it is created due to an external choice as opposed to the axe somehow 
automatically creating the material (naturally) without there being any choice involved. Or for 
example in terms of matter, the carpenter would need wood, or the seamstress would need the help 
of a needle or in terms of time, a human would need summer. Now the reason for the effect can be 
a provoking reason such as the need for the one who eats to eat so that he is no longer hungry or the 
removal of a barrier such as the person who washes needs to the clouds to disappear so that he can 
place his clothes outside so that they can be dried. Avicenna explained that for the effect to not come 
into existence it would mean that the cause is not in the status or position so that it would bring the 
effect into existence or to not be in the way so that it can cause the effect naturally or its essence is in 
such a way that it naturally causes the effect to come into existence or to not come into existence at 
all (this is the point that al-Ghazali catches on Avicenna which we will explore further in this thesis).
124
 
As long as there is nothing stopping the cause from the outside or the doer exists by itself, but itself 
is not the cause, then in this scenario the effect will be depending on the existence of the above 
mentioned condition. But if that condition exists irrespective of whether it is natural or by an 
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independent Will or by any other means, it will necessitate that the effect should also exist. If these 
conditions of the causes are not present, then it will necessitate the opposite which is that the effect 
also does not exist. On the other hand, if any of the causes exist continuously then the effect will also 
be continuous and similarly if the cause is temporary then the effect will also be temporary. If the 
cause is similar to itself and it never changes and it causes a specific result then it is appropriate to 
conclude that the effect will be existing infinitely with the cause (which means that its effect will be 
existing from it, which in our scenario is the universe). But if it is not called the affected thing because 
it did not have non-existence then that this is not a problem as long as the meaning mentioned above 
is obvious.
125
 So if God existed without the universe, then nothing affected his Will to cause him to 
create the universe as there is nothing in existence except for God and as such he would have 
remained in this condition or status without there being a universe for eternity. So, if he had not 
created it immediately he would not have created it ‘later’. But the universe was created and that it 
was created by God, and as such that creation must be eternal. To summarise the position of 
Avicenna, he argues that because God is eternal and he is the cause then the effect must also be 
eternal as the cause and effect are linked. A temporal cause results in a temporal effect and an eternal 
cause results in an eternal effect - because we have an eternal God then the universe must also be 
eternal.  
Avicenna discusses the relationship between cause and effect from a variety of angles, which for him 
is important as a key aspect of his argument for the pre-eternity of the Universe relies on cause and 
effect. He argues that cause can affect the effect in three manners. (I) That it will be causing all the 
time and therefore the effect will be occurring all the time infinitely. (II) That it is a temporary natural 
cause. (III) That it is a temporary cause based on its Will. An example of temporary natural cause 
would be a magnet which does not intend to pull something but its cause happens naturally due to 
the nature of the magnet. The problem with this is that a lack of will cannot be attributed to God as 
he would lose his Godliness. In terms of God willing something then whatever will be happening will 
                                                          
125 Avicenna, Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, (Dar al-Ma’arif, Cairo, Egypt, 1985), Volume 3, Page 74 
58 
 
occur by the desire of God or by some other means that were not explained by God. The ancient 
Greek philosophers describe God and his acts as natural. But Muslim philosophers including 
Avicenna argue that God causes by his will, so God is not forced to produce without his will. In this 
specific text Avicenna did not state whether he supported that it is a natural cause and effect. Although 
in the book he did not support the opinion that it occurs by Will but in many other places and books 
he affirms that God Wills things into creation. Some do misunderstand Avicenna’s view and believe 
that the process of creating the universe is an automatic or natural process such as the emanation of 
light from the sun or the flowing of water from a spring
126
, natural affects that deny the effect of Gods’ 
Will.
127
 Imam Ghazalis refutation of Avicenna does not mention the issue of him affirming or denying 
the (irada) will of God, therefore it is safe to assume that al-Ghazali was aware of Avicenna’s position 
and that he believed that creation was by the Will of God. The issue Ghazali had with Avicenna was 
that he split the cause into several categories such as the causer holds the condition of being the cause 
infinitely and therefore rationally it will cause the effect infinitely. If this was not the case then God 
would be unable to create as God would have a desire to create but he is not able to do it, therefore 
disability is attributed to God and this is impossible.
128
 Another categorisation is that the causer will 
come into the condition to cause the effect temporarily in specific times, then the result of this cause 
will also be temporary. The problem with this approach according to Avicenna is the cause being 
enacted in bursts means that time is applicable on God. Because at one point he is not causing so 
there is no effect and later he is causing and there is an effect. The third is the causer will hold the 
status of being a cause but there will be a barrier to triggering the effect and therefore the result will 
not be present. This would mean that there is something that is blocking God from causing the effect, 
which means that he is disabled from preventing the block and not powerful enough to stop the 
barrier. We have also discussed in detail the issue of there being a delay in the effect after it has been 
enacted by the cause. All of the possible conditions that are mentioned are based on rational thought, 
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therefore they can only be dismissed by an equivalent rational repost. So the only way that the position 
of Imam Ghazali can be supported is with the added condition that nothing in God changes, although 
many would argue that the problem with the position of al-Ghazali is that it does infer a change in 
God. The countering position of Avicenna is that if God is in that status and he does not change then 
the result should always be present. 
The opinion of Avicenna is often misconstrued and presented as being the same as the Mutazalite 
opinion, which was presented by Kaabi. His style of writing in the Isharaat is not to mention the name 
of the group from whom he is presenting the ideas. He explains that some of the Mutazalites argue 
that when the effect came into existence there is no longer a need for the causer. So even if the cause 
does disappear then the subject will continue existing, for example, imagine a builder constructs a 
building if the builder perishes the building will continue to exist. The consequence of their position 
is that the universe would continue existing even if God disappeared, as the universe only needed 
God to bring it into existence. The Mutazalite position is that brining something into existence means 
that it comes from non-existence and as long as he is the cause and he brought something into 
existence after it not existing, why is there a need to continuously keep bringing it from non-existence 
to existence? If it needs God for continued existence then this will necessitate that anything whose 
existence needs someone else to bring it into existence even if that need is for God, which would 
result in infinite regress.
129
 
Another argument regarding the pre-eternity of the universe from Avicenna is the issue of the 
possibility of something coming into existence, that there was a determining factor at the exact 
instance of creation because if it were not then it would have remained in pure equilibrium with the 
possibility that it may or may not be created. If then something has caused this thing to exist then that 
thing must also have a determining factor, and similarly that determining factor should have another 
determining factor ad infinitum. Based on this one must accept this argument or look for alternative 
which is in God from whom comes new determining factors which are eternal. But the problem is 
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that those who accept an eternal God do not accept that there could be new determining factors 
which in this case would also be eternal. The reason for this is that it would mean that God is changing 
which is not possible for an eternal God. This argument of Avicenna although presented from an 
alternative angle has roots in Aristotelian philosophy. Before we move onto the argument of change 
we need to analyse the issue of possible, impossible and necessary existence in more detail. Greek as 
well as Muslim philosophers from a variety of camps have spoken about it in great detail. In the 
Philosophy of Avicenna, and the same can be said of Aristotle, substances come before accidents. 
Basic substances from which specific substances such humans, plants and so on are formed are from 
form and matter.  
Avicenna had a large number of arguments to prove his position for the pre-eternity of the universe 
as well his numerous refutations against those who believe in the temporal nature of the universe. 
But his most prominent and in my opinion the most effective and detrimental to those who believe 
in the temporal nature of the universe is related to the issue of creating the universe in time. Avicenna 
explains the concept of ‘before’ and ‘after’ by explaining that we know that something exists after 
another thing and this can be in terms of time and space. Even if they exist at the same time their 
existence in relation to one another is based on the spacial location from one another.
130
 The 
argument of Avicenna is the following: if the existence of A comes after the existence of B, then the 
B is not because of the existence of A. Therefore, the existence of A can only come by due to the 
existence of B and things happened to A only because of B. But as for B it does not rely on A to 
exist and there is no intermediary between B and A so that B can exist. Therefore, the existence of 
B is not due to A, as well as the fact that A only exists due to its dependence on B. An example of 
this is the idea that when I moved my hand the key also turned, you never describe this as the key 
turned and then your hand turned even though they both occurred simultaneously. The fact that one 
is appearing to occur after the other is not due to time and space but instead it is by essence.
131
 
Therefore one is occurring with the other by essence and not due to time and space. From this we 
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can deduce that the status of something which is gained by the essence without being due to something 
else and without the status of the other thing being before not by time and space but instead by 
essence. Anything whose existence comes due to another thing, if that other thing was not present it 
would also not exist. As such, its existence relies on the existence of another. This thing that relies on 
the existence of another is considered something that is created out of nothing be essence. So God 
created the universe not by time and space but instead by essence, as the creation of the universe 
relies on God and anything whose existence relies on another it is a created entity, but by essence.
132
 
Avicenna, like the Muslim theologians that oppose him, believes that the universe was created by 
God. The main disagreement between them is their understanding of ‘subsequent’. Avicenna holds 
that it is by essence and whereas the differing theologians state that it is by time. Those hold the 
second and third position that the universe was created by God both posit that time was created by 
God and that this created time cannot be applied to God. The reason for this is that it results in the 
following impossibilities. By applying time to God, it would mean that there is some form of change 
in God. It would mean that God was present in the universe for ‘some period’ of time, he ‘then’ 
created the universe and the universe ‘then’ came into existence. It means that God was not creating 
and then he decided to create. This would be change in the Will of God, so initially he had no will 
to create, then there was a point when he decided to create and later when this Will was accomplished 
he then may or may not have stopped creating.
133
 To add to this, that would also mean that when he 
stopped created there was then a further change in God. There may be some that would argue that 
God is now continuously changing and if that is the case then it would mean that God has to be forced 
to in the situation of continuously creating so that he is not affected by change.  This means that there 
are several points in ‘time’ where the Will of God changed. Also by bringing the universe into 
existence after it not existing means that one is applying time to God,
134
 which in turn means that there 
was a point in time where there was no creation then there was a later point in time where God 
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decided to create the universe. Another problem with attributing time to God is that the result cannot 
come into effect randomly and without a cause but there must have been something that caused this 
effect, and like anything that causes an effect, that cause must be external to the effect (in this case 
the ‘new’ Will of God), this cause will make a change in the effect and this would result in a new state 
that was not present before the effect of the cause.
135
 To be in a state where one can be affected by 
another is also impossible for God. Something can only be effected by a cause if it meets all of the 
conditions of being affected at that point. Therefore, the effect coming later, which in this case is the 
creation of the universe, can only happen if one of these conditions were previously missing and as 
such it did not fulfil the condition of being able to cause an affect and only once this new condition 
came to be was it made it made possible for God to have an effect on something and as such create 
the world. As Avicenna declared, it is impossible for God to have a ‘missing’ condition.136 
It was Avicenna’s insistence that time, which is a creation of God, cannot be applied on God. As such 
in Avicenna’s model of the universe, God and the world are not related to each other by time.137 
Instead, Avicenna holds the position that God and the universe are related to each other by essence, 
which means that God created the universe, so he is the creator and is superior to his creation which 
is the universe.
138
 The universe is a creation of God and as such it is dependent on God. It is important 
to note in this juncture that when Avicenna states that they are related to each other by essence
139
 he 
doesn’t mean a physical connection as that would also be impossible for God. Therefore, this 
position of superiority over the universe is not one that is related to time, which is the position held 
by al-Ghazali and later theologians but instead it is a position of superiority due to essence. As we 
explained above in regard to the nature of cause and effect, Avicenna tries to give an analogical 
example where he states that it is as a person who opens a lock on a door and when our hand turns 
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the key turns with it.
140
 Once again he does not mean this by the physical sense but he is trying to 
show that they are not related in time but despite this they both exist and one relies on the other. It 
is regarding this issue that latter theologians used to state that Avicenna is a disbeliever as they claim 
that he states the universe is uncreated. Avicenna as we have seen has stated in many occasions that 
the universe is created therefore claims made against Avicenna regarding this point have no basis. 
Avicenna famously rebuking al-Biruni for insinuating that Aristotle did not believe in a creator in his 
model of pre-eternity of the universe. “Your claim that when Aristotle said «the universe has no 
beginning» he did not mean that it does not have a Maker has no validity, because surely if actions 
have no beginning it is impossible to imagine that the universe has a creator.”141  According to al-
Biruni the opinion of Aristotle will mean that the Universe has no creator, if you say that it has no 
beginning. In order for anything to have a maker, it has to have a starting point, for if it never started 
then there cannot be a maker of it, because the maker should exist first. Therefore saying ‘Has no 
beginning’ is the same as to say ‘Has no creator’. Despite this claim of al-Biruni, as we have explained, 
Avicenna does believe in a creator but instead negates time being applied to God and he is adamant 
that Aristotle also believes in a creator.  
The best summary of the position of Avicenna can be read in his own writings where he explains that 
God is unique, and his existence is necessary due to himself and the necessary existence is due to his 
attributes and his pre-eternity.
142
 The Universe is his creation and relies on him to bring it into 
existence.
143
 It is not possible that there is a new Will or desire that occurs for God when he decides 
to create, without there being some reason to cause this change in his Will or desire. It cannot occur 
spontaneous or naturally.
144
 It is also not possible for God to create the universe at a specific point in 
time. As this would mean that there was a period of time ‘before’ God created the universe, and then 
‘later’ he decided to create the universe.145 The relationship between God and the universe is one of 
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God being superior to his creation which in this case is the universe. God is the cause of the universe 
and the reason for the possible thing (the world) comes into existence, after previously not existing. 
This clearly demonstrates the concept of the universe being in need of God. Time is merely the 
measurement of the movement of matter, as such time was created with matter, as they are linked by 
virtue of one being the measurement of the other. Therefore, they are both pre-eternally linked, 
whenever there was time there was matter. The link of God and the universe is not due to time but 
essence.
146
 
When one reads the story of Avicenna and more so thinks about his legacy, it is one of the greatest 
tragedies to have occurred in history and more so in the Muslim World. He was a pioneer in a wide 
range of academic fields. In medicine he was at the forefront in his time, being the first person to 
operate on the appendix, a treatment which in modern times has become very common. He was at 
the forefront of theology and philosophy and developed ideas that are still used in current times. For 
example, his books in logic are still taught in modern universities. But it was the resistance of his 
opponents who were in positions of power in terms of authority, money and religious influence that 
caused him to be exiled. This judgement of heresy and disbelief from al-Ghazali caused him to be 
abandoned in the Muslim world and stopped the progress that he had made in the field of science 
and philosophy. Had Avicenna not been ostracised the advancements made in the twenty first century 
would have happened centuries earlier. As it was the Western world who were the true inheritors of 
Avicenna, and developed his thoughts and ideas, but they began from a less advanced position than 
the Muslim World. The issue of the pre-eternity of the Universe presents one of the greatest ironies 
in the history of Islam. Al-Maturidi and al-Ashari are considered the fathers of Sunni Islam because 
their groups oppose the anthropomorphists (modern day Salafists), in that they reject the idea of 
applying human attributes to God, such as God having a body and limbs, God being within the 
universe etc. The position of Avicenna was to apply this methodology consistently and perfectly. He 
rejected the fact that one could apply time to God or that God can have a change of Will or desire. 
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He did this as he saw time as a creation and a creation cannot be applied on God. He therefore was 
ensuring that he did not anthropomorphise God, something which makes sense based on his own 
methodology. The methodology of Avicenna was not the only factor but also the fact that his direct 
opponents at the time were the Hanablite rulers, who themselves held anthropomorphist views. 
Despite him not anthropomorphising God, he was considered a heretic and a disbeliever due to al-
Ghazali, whereas al-Mautridi whose school became famous for holding similar views remained 
accepted as the pillar of Sunni Islam.   
 
 
Al-Biruni and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Al-Biruni was a scholar and a scientist born in Khawarazm
147
 in the tenth century.
148
 Al-Biruni worked 
for the leader Mahmud of Ghazna as a court appointed astronomer, astrologer and scholar. Later he 
would continue working under the sponsorship of his son Masud. Al-Biruni is well known for being 
vehemently against Avicenna and his position of pre-eternity of matter.
149
 What makes their dispute 
all the more logical is that al-Biruni was working for those who were in power, whereas Avicenna was 
in fact despised by those in power. His debate with Avicenna via an exchange of letters is famous 
where they had a dialogue about eighteen issues. It is possible that this debate from the point of view 
of al-Biruni was at the request or a method to show his support of those in power. In the debate, one 
of the topics they contested was regarding the pre-eternity of matter.  
Al-Biruni was a vehement supporter of the position that the universe was created out of nothing 
(Creatio ex Nihilo) and was a strong advocate against the position of the universe being eternal. He 
is strong in opposition against those who believe in an eternal universe to the extent that he does not 
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hold back in his attack against them, for example he states that ‘Other people, besides, hold this 
foolish persuasion, that time has no terminus quo at all.’’150 This strong attack of his opponent can be 
seen in his letter to Avicenna where he argues that when Aristotle could not defend the position and 
he was following his own desire rather than searching for the truth. For example, he states that 
“Nothing caused the emergence of this objection except what has been accepted as a necessity of the 
limit of the motions and times from their initial beginnings. Aristotle himself admitted this fact when 
he was explaining impossibility of the existence of infinity. When he evaded elaboration on this topic, 
he merely followed his caprice.”151 Al-Biruni is arguing that Aristotle is inconsistent in his point about 
time and motion. He argues that Aristotle initially accepts that time and movement are limited at the 
start point but then later contradicts himself by claiming that the universe does not have a start as it is 
pre-eternal. Time is the measurement of the movement of matter, and matter is the building block 
of the universe. The universe is the composite of these parts which come together to create time. If 
time and matter are limited at their start point, then matter must also be limited at its start. If matter 
has an origin then the universe also has a start point. In terms of his criticism of the contradiction 
contained within the argument of Aristotle, then on the surface of it Al-Biruni does make a strong 
argument. But what Aristotle is arguing is that time and motion are limited in the sense that they are 
created entities which move from one point to another or from movement to non-movement. So 
God created the universe and this was not in time but instead by essence. The universe and time are 
therefore eternal.   
Al-Biruni began the argument by dealing with the issue of the universe having no beginning but yet 
still having a creator. “Your claim that when Aristotle said «the universe has no beginning» he did not 
mean that it does not have a Maker has no validity, because surely if actions have no beginning it is 
impossible to imagine that the universe has a creator.”152 Al-Biruni’s focus in the letter exchange 
between himself and Avicenna regarding pre-eternity of matter was the position of Aristotle regarding 
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this issue. “And if Aristotle's belief were that the world has a beginning in the terms of the initiator 
but not in time, what [business] does he have in mentioning the sect and their testimonies about the 
changes of attributes not necessitating changes in essence!”153 As explained throughout this thesis, 
there were a variety of proofs presented by Aristotle regarding the pre-eternity of matter. One of these 
was that it would mean that there has been a change in the Creator. Al-Biruni used this position of 
Aristotle to attempt to prove that Aristotle believed that the universe has no creator. Al-Biruni uses 
the argument of Aristotle that the Universe coming into existence after not being is a change and is 
using this to disprove the ‘sects’ that hold an alternative opinion which according Al-Biruni would 
mean that Aristotle did not actually believe in a creator as claimed by Avicenna. If there was a change 
in the creator of universe then it would mean that there has been a change in the effect. Therefore, 
despite the plea of Avicenna that Aristotle does believe in a creator, in reality he does not. Al-Biruni 
also argued that that an aspect of time that must be considered is its qualitative nature, something he 
learnt due to his travels to India and his research into Hindu ideologies. This was the idea that if 
something existed at one time, which was accurately recorded, it may have existed in another time 
and may have a greater influence on the cosmic environment of that specific period, in which events 
unfold according to the universal laws of the universe which operate at each point in time.
154
  
Al-Biruni was a scholar who was headstrong in his belief that the universe was created out of nothing. 
He was proud of the fact that he believed that he was following the textual evidence of the religion 
without being influenced by Greek philosophers such as Aristotle.
155
 He was alive during the time of 
the Avicenna, but his debate with Avicenna on this issue did not have the depth or length to cover 
the intricacies of the issue. One may argue that this could be due to the fact that Avicenna delegated 
the responsibility of continuing the debate with al-Biruni to his students. If the debate had been more 
fruitful it may have given people are better understanding of the position of Avicenna regarding the 
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pre-eternity of the world. Although on the other hand, a misstep, or a perceived unacceptable position 
could have also resulted in his execution by those in power.  
 
 
Al-Ghazali and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Al-Ghazali was highly critical of Muslim philosophers to the point that he insinuated that they were 
disbelievers, as he explained they left their religion to follow the philosophers. He was aware that the 
philosophers held a variety of ideas and positions, but the focus of his refutation was Aristotle because 
according to him he was the most famous and successful in his refutation of the other philosophers.  
The main objective of his famous book ‘The Incoherence of the Philosophers’ is to disprove the 
positions of his opponents as opposed to the book being used for a higher purpose such as being a 
proof for the existence of God. As such, the first chapter jumps right into the topic of the pre-eternity 
of the universe. In the book he refutes twenty issues that are supported by the philosophers, three of 
these issues held more significance than the rest because these issues according to al-Ghazali were 
positions held by the philosophers which included Avicenna, that were tantamount to disbelief. 
These issues were (I) The issue of the pre-eternity of the universe, where they hold that all substances 
are eternal, (II) The belief that God’s knowledge does not include knowledge of particulars 
(individual objects), (III) The rejection of the resurrection of the physical body. Al-Ghazali argued 
that all three of these theories are in direct opposition to the teachings of Islam.
156
 Al-Ghazali was very 
headstrong about this issue, stating that anyone who believes in these issues has gone to the extent of 
accusing the prophets of falsehood and that their teachings are hypocritical misrepresentations of 
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Islam whose sole purpose is to appeal to the crowds. This according to al-Ghazali is blasphemy and 
there are no Muslim groups that would agree to this proposition.
157
  
Imam Ghazali was very critical of the philosophy of Avicenna and what he believed to be clear links 
to Aristotelian philosophy. He argued that it is related from Plato that the universe was created within 
time, but then the philosophers inferred his position as being metaphorical, refusing to accept his 
clear and unambiguous statement that the universe is temporal.
158
 The irony of the attack of al-Ghazali 
on the philosophers is that many of the arguments used by al-Ghazali are in fact from philosophers. 
Most of the arguments of al-Ghazali are based on Ashari theology
159
, and Asharis took from the Stoics 
the idea of irrationality in theological concepts and their philosophical speculations, which is mixed 
with theories of Scepticism. Al-Ghazali took many of his positions from the Stoics
160
, as well as other 
philosophers
161
 such as the idea of the impossibility of infinite succession of temporality limited 
worlds.
162
 The Asharis and Stoics hold the middle way between the traditionalists who reject all types 
of reasoning and those who use reasoning without the need for religious scripture. 
He began by explaining that he believed that the Universe came into existence out of nothing due to 
the eternal Will of God, who decided that it came into existence at a specific time
163
, and that it was 
God who decided that Universe was initially in a state of non-existence and that it remained in this 
state of not existing until he decided that it would no longer be the case and that the universe would 
be created.’164 Al-Ghazali is attempting to prove that the universe is temporal and that it came into 
existence after previously not existing. Al-Ghazali was insisting that in his model there was no change 
in God and nor was there a missing condition in God that initially was not present but later came into 
existence. Instead he argued that God always has the ability to create and nor was it that the Will of 
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God did came to be after not existing and nor was there a missing condition that later came to be so 
that something can be created. Al-Ghazali argues that the will of God to create is pre-eternal and 
therefore has always existed but it was God who chose to use this pre-eternal Will to create the 
universe at the point it was created
165
, and it was not created before this because had not willed for it 
to be created prior to this point.
166
 The example many theologians give on this issue is that of musician, 
can someone be called a musician before he has played a piece of music? They argue that even 
though he never played an instrument, the musician always possessed the ability to play the 
instrument and he merely decided to make it a reality when he chose to play the instrument. There 
are clear deficiencies in this argument of al-Ghazali, the main one being, which Avicenna has 
explained, that he is applying time to God. The main problem that he is attempting to counter by 
mentioning this point is the problem with this idea linking with some form of ‘change in God’. 
Avicenna has already explained that if we were to say that the universe is not eternal, then this will 
result in one of following impossible conditions, which is that either the will of creating occurred to 
God after not being, or it was the case that God always possessed this will but due to other factors 
was unable to create as witnessed by the fact that God did not create or he was missing a condition 
that allowed him to create which he later was possessed so that he was able to bring the universe into 
existence.
167
 In terms of the Will being delayed from the action, al-Ghazali argues that the universe 
came into existence at a time appointed by God an that God may have placed certain conditions in 
the laws of the universe such that when these conditions came into place the will was enacted and the 
universe came into existence.  
Another argument of al-Ghazali is the classical first cause argument. He argued that it is not logical 
to reject the idea that something like the created universe which is temporal can come from something 
eternal such as God. Examples of this can be seen in the created world, where certain temporal things 
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are the cause of other temporal things.  It is impossible to believe that one temporal thing is the cause 
of another temporal and that is the cause of another temporal thing and this would continue ad 
infinitum.
168
 This is not logical and as such is not possible, what this means is that in order to break 
this link of causes ad infinitum one would need to introduce an eternal creator who is the first cause 
of the universe.
169
 Al-Ghazali is attempting to show that there is no problem with attributing an 
accidental effect to an eternal cause, which is God. Take for example one accidental (such as the 
colour white) which is caused by another accidental (such as the colour red fading out of existence). 
There are only two options; either the affected accidental, which is the colour white, is dependent on 
the previous accidental the colour red and that accidental is depending on another and this continues 
ad infinitum, or the alternative option is that the first of these accidentals relies on an eternal cause 
which does not rely on something else to exist. He continues that if this means that it is not possible 
for the first accidental to have a beginning then it means that this first accidental relies on something 
that is eternal. This means that according to al-Ghazali there is no problem with believing that 
something temporal can come from something eternal. There are a couple of problems with this 
argument of al-Ghazali. Firstly, he is bringing God down to the level of creation because for him in 
the first cause argument he needs there to be the first cause that pushes the second effect to come 
into existence. The second problem is that he argues that all of the temporal accidents do not have a 
beginning as one is the cause of other and that is cause of another and this continues ad infinitum 
and because none of these have a beginning the chain of causation needs to have a first cause who is 
God, but in the model of al-Ghazali God also doesn’t have a beginning and he is still the first cause170 
and he hasn’t given a clear enough explanation as to why the result of there being no beginning for 
accidentals would mean that there has to be a creator. A creator who according to al-Ghazali also 
doesn’t have a beginning.171  
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Al-Ghazali questions whether the philosophers position regarding the impossibility of an eternal Will 
related to a temporal creation is based on the necessity of reason or based on theoretical reflection. 
He argues that if their position is based on the method of theoretical reflection then the philosophers 
have failed to demonstrate the strength of their position. On the other hand, if their position is based 
on the argument of necessity of reason, then he argued that why is it that a large proportion of people 
who oppose the position of an eternal universe do not subscribe to it.
172
  
Al-Ghazali also responds to the argument of the philosophers that if God did create the universe in 
time, why did he choose this time as opposed to a different time? Because no one time would be 
better than another, as in all situations God would create the best possible universe. And as such if 
there is there is no difference between any time, then that negates choice. Al-Ghazali argues that this 
is like when it comes to a choice, and one chooses between two similar options and of those options 
one chooses the best option.
173
 Al-Ghazali continues that God could have easily have created the 
universe differently and it would have operated effectively in a different manner, for example the 
planets rotating in the opposite direction. Obviously, Averroes disagreed with this position and stated 
that the universe as we see it has been created in the best possible way. He also argues that in this 
scenario it’s no choice between two similar choices, but instead it’s a choice between something either 
coming into or existence or not existing and that God knew from eternity that our universe was the 
best incarnation and such it was created eternally as it was better that it was in existence as opposed 
to not being in existence.
174
 
Al-Ghazali does not really deal with the most pertinent point in a detailed manner, which is the 
appliction of time on God. He merely presents the argument of Avicenna and states that God being 
before
175
 the world does not mean that one is applying time to God.
176
 The problem with this statement 
of al-Ghazali as we mentioned earlier is that he is applying the word ‘before’ to God. ‘Before’ being 
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a moment in time that precedes the current moment in time. Therefore al-Ghazali is applying time 
to God which is the reason for Avicenna, Averroes and many other Muslim philosophers rejecting 
this notion and arguing for the position of the eternal universe. When one reads the works of al-
Ghazali, you see that he devotes a large proportion of his writing to disprove the position of those 
that he opposes, but he doesn’t take enough time in his writing to explain his own position or 
arguments. As such, he never fleshes out the proofs and argument for his own position. This is 
because his writing style in ‘Incoherence of the Philosophers’ is to display the arguments of his 
opponents at length and then for him to respond to those arguments, which at times can be quite 
brief and even when they are not brief, this still does not respond to the argument of his opponents 
in an effective manner. 
 
 
Ibn Tufayl and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Tufayl is a famous Muslim scholar from the twelfth 
century who born in a small town in Spain. He was a philosopher as well as a Sufi mystic. His main 
works is ‘Hayy ibn Yaqzan’ (The Living Son of the Vigilant). The title of his book is taken from the 
famous treatise of Avicenna. Both of them use the story to express their ideas through an allegory.
177
 
The story of Ibn Tufayl has some similarities to the famous ‘Jungle Book’, as it is about a young child 
who is the only human on the island and is brought up by a deer. He used the book to explain the 
role of a human and the development of the rational process in one’s life. In the first stage of his life, 
which consists of seven years, he is cared for by the deer until she died. In these seven years he had 
learnt to imitate other animals, by copying their speech and the fact that he should cover his private 
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parts - which he noticed the animals had covered by their hair. In his attempt to understand the 
reason for the death of the deer, he dissected her, whereby he achieved a better understanding of the 
anatomy of an animal and of what is the source of life. The next two stages of his life, which are 
fourteen years, Hayy learns by learning, exploring and gaining knowledge about the things around 
him, such as anatomy, movement and numbers etc. It was during this period of learning and 
exploration that he comes to the belief that there must be a creator of the universe. The final stage 
of his life was his desire for spiritual fulfilment. He did this by imitating heavenly bodies and then 
later understanding that using a mechanism which in this case was physical movement, does not bring 
him closer to God. Ibn Tufayl neither disagreed with nor supported the position of the pre-eternity 
of the universe. He was neutral on the matter although he did analyse the issue through the thoughts 
of his titular character Hayy ibn Yaqzan.
178
 
Ibn Tufayl was a great supporter and advocate of Avicenna this can not only be seen by the fact that 
he names his work ‘Hayy ibn Yaqzan’ after the work of the same name written by Avicenna, but also 
the fact that he doesn’t criticise Avicenna in his book despite criticising scholars such as al-Farabi for 
having inconsistent views. He also explains that he will explain the statements and positions of 
Avicenna in the rest of his book. In his book he covers the issue of the pre-eternity of the universe 
through the analysis and deep thought of his titular character Hayy ibn Yaqzan. Hayy is in deep 
thought where he debates with himself whether the creation of the universe existed within time after 
not previously not existing and its existence was Creatio Ex Nihilo or whether the world is pre-eternal 
without anything coming before it.  He explained that he felt that both of these ideas were equally 
strong and it gave him many doubts about which idea was stronger. The reason for this was that when 
he thought about the position of the pre-eternity of the universe, he felt that there were a number of 
flaws with the idea, such as he felt that the position of an eternal existence conflicts with the idea of 
infinite extension. Therefore, if this is the case, then as such this eternal being would not be free from 
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new accidents that are created, which they themselves should be newly created, because they cannot 
come before the accidents preceding them. What this means is that if something cannot exist before 
the accidents that are created within time must also be created within time. Whereas, alternatively for 
those who disagree with the pre-eternity of the universe, if he considers that it was a newly created, 
then the problem with this idea is that it is impossible for it to be newly created, unless one assumes 
that time came before it, whereas time is an entity that is linked to the universe and it cannot be 
detached from it, as time is the measurement of the movement of the universe. Therefore, the 
universe cannot have been created after time. He then argues that when something is created it needs 
to have someone who created it. And if this is the case then why did the creator decide to generate 
the universe at that time as opposed to before or after it was created? Was it because of chance? Or 
was it because of something new that had happened to this creator that caused this creation? But this 
is not possible as there is nothing that existed with God other than himself. So if this is the case then 
it would mean that there would be a material change in the nature of God which caused him to create 
the universe and there has to be a reason for that change.
179
 
He felt that both of these opinions were alike in the sense that both had strengths and weaknesses. If 
the universe had been created in time and had come into existence after coming from nothing, it 
would then mean that it did not come into existence by itself, without the help of something eternal 
that created it and that this creator must be such that we cannot comprehend him by our created 
senses, because if he could fall within the parameters of our senses then he must have a body, and if 
he is body then the must be an element of the universe and therefore based on this he would be a 
created bring as opposed to be the creator. It is the same as one who is need of another to create 
him, and if this creator was a body then he would depend on another who would then also depend 
another and it would be continue like this ad infinitum, which is not possible. Therefore, the creation 
of the universe is need of a creator who is not a body, and if this creator is not a body then it 
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impossible for us perceive him through our senses, because the senses can only comprehend material 
bodies or accidents that are linked to these bodies. If the creator of the universe cannot be 
comprehended by our senses, then it is impossible for him to be perceived by our imagination, 
because the imagination uses the forms of thing in their absence, which is used to comprehend 
information before it is funnelled through to our senses. If the creator is not a body, then one cannot 
attribute to him any properties of a body, nor can one attribute to him any elements that are linked 
to bodies, as he is free from any of them. If God is the creator of the universe, then he holds dominion 
over it as well as possessing all there is to know about it.
180
 
Now when it comes to the position of supporting the pre-eternity of the universe, that the universe is 
eternal and always existed without there being something before it, then it would mean that movement 
is also eternal, as there cannot be any rest before it from the point that it will begin its movement. All 
types of movement require someone to cause it to move, and this mover must be a force through 
some body, and that body should be through a body of a being which has an ability to move by itself, 
or moves through some other body, or it is through a force that doesn’t go through a body. Every 
force which moves though a body increases or decreases if the body itself increases or decreases. Ibn 
Tufayl gives the example of the weight in a stone, which moves downwards, if you split the stone into 
two parts then the weight is also divided by two and similarly if you were to add to double it then the 
weight would be doubled. And if one were to add stones ad infinitum, then the weight would also 
increase ad infinitum. Similarly, if the stone would increase by a certain size then the weight increases 
by the same amount. But we are aware that all bodies cannot be infinite and instead must be finite 
and as such the force which is in the body must also be finite. Therefore, if there is an external agent 
that can produce an effect that is infinite that external agent cannot be a body. We can see that that 
heaven moves through continuous movement, without ever stopping, as we know that the heaven is 
eternal. We know that the force that causes the movement of the heavens is not within its own body, 
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nor is it in any exterior body, but it continuous from something which is separate to the body and it 
cannot be demonstrated by a physical body or physical assets. As Ibn Tufayl explained through his 
character Hayy ibn Yaqzan, he previously understood that the true reality of the body comprised of 
its form, whose nature is linked to various types of movements, but the reality which comprises its 
matter is limited and can be conceived. As such, the normal way of the universe is that it is linked to 
motion, by the person who causes the movement, who is not affected by matter or the attributes of a 
body, which is not linked to anything that we can understand through our senses or our imagination 
can comprehend. Therefore, if the creator of the universe is the proficient cause of the movement 
of the heavens, which he produces by his action and will, where there is no deficiency, no removal 
and or no termination, then there is no doubt that he has power over the universe as well as having 
knowledge of it. After contemplating all of these arguments, both supporting and rejecting both 
arguments, he came to the understanding that there is no harm in believing in either the pre-eternity 
of the Universe and or in Creatio ex Nihilo, as it was clear to him that despite the differences in both 
opinions, the most important aspect of both positions is that they both required a belief in a creator 
of the universe, namely God. 
181
 
 
 
Averroes and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Averroes is a scholar from the twelfth century who wrote his book ‘Incoherence of the Incoherence’ 
as a refutation of the work of al-Ghazali. Averroes was a big supporter of Avicenna and his works and 
he maintained that many of the arguments of Ghazali were merely ‘statements of sophistry’.182 He 
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argued that al-Ghazali failed to deal with the arguments presented by Avicenna and instead went on 
a tangent. Averroes argues that the position of Ghazali - that there was a time before the creation of 
the universe where God did not create and then later God decided to create and that this does not 
mean that one is applying time to God as he always had the ability to create - was an extremely weak 
argument. He argued that even if one were to accept the notion that creation occurs after a period of 
time after the Will, it is not possible that there would be a delay in God willing and then the creation 
coming into effect.
 183
 This would mean that there was some type of deficiency in God because he 
want to create something and he wills it to happen but this will only come into effect after a certain 
period of time. This delay in creating after something being willed in not possible for the perfect 
attribute of willing for God.  
Al-Ghazali argued that despite the contention of the philosophers that the temporal cannot absolutely 
come from that which is eternal. Because if we imagine that the temporal universe did not come from 
an eternal God, then the reason that the temporal universe did not come into existence was due to 
the fact nothing gave it push so that it would exist and instead it would remain in the state of having 
the possibility of existing without really existing.
184
 Now, if after this state of having the possibility of 
existing but not existing, the universe then came into existence, it means that something pushed it 
into existence and this pushing into existence would have either occurred a ‘new’ or it was did come 
into existence a ‘new’.185 That means that if it didn’t occur a ‘new’, the universe will remain as an 
absolute possibility as it was before. Now if this push into existence occurred, then we have to speak 
about what brought it into existence, and why was it brought into existence now as opposed to before 
or later. If this is the case, then there are only two options the first is that that these accidents go back 
infinitely as we explained earlier in the thesis or it was a pre-eternal creator who caused it or pushed 
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it into existence.
186
 Averroes wasn’t too impressed with this position of al-Ghazali; he felt that al-
Ghazali was being unnecessarily argumentative without presenting an argument that is logical and can 
provide certainty.
187
 It seems like Averroes is being unfair to the statement of al-Ghazali because 
although al-Ghazali has left pertinent questions unanswered such as applying time to God and the act 
coming after a period after the will, there isn’t a flaw in the position of possibility, which he has 
presented. Averrroes begins by explaining that using the word mumkin (possible) is not completely 
accurate in this context, because the term mumkin (possible) things refers to things that have a greater 
chance of occurring, such as for example a seventy percent chance, or it could be used for a possible 
thing which has a smaller chance of occurring such as thirty percent chance and it could likewise refer 
to something which has a fifty-fifty percent chance of occurring. The problem is that in this situation 
something having the possibility of existing would only be a fifty percent chance of occurring and not 
occurring before something gives it a ‘push’ to bring it into existence.188 Averroes also argued that 
when something has a possibility of existing, which in reality is a form of measuring possibility, it is 
not necessary that it has to be ‘pushed’ into existence by someone who is external to it, but instead it 
can give itself a ‘push’ from being a possibility of existing to coming into existence. Averroes argues 
that this would then also mean that this form of possibility would not only just be applicable on the 
one who is receiving the act (in this case the created universe) but it would also apply to the one who 
‘causes’ it to come into existence, because it is possible that he brings it into existence but it is equally 
possible that he may not bring it into existence.
189
 What is obvious is that the need for it to be brought 
into existence does not automatically give it a ‘priority’ to bring it into existence. The reason for this 
is that it is understood that the possibility of the object coming into existence, which receives the act 
is in need from the one who ‘pushes’ it into existence. This can be seen by the practical examples we 
see around us, although natural events might leave some ambiguity. This is because for most of the 
natural things which initiate a form of change, in the first instance the change actually happens to itself 
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and as such most people think that the thing that is moving or in our case the thing that is being 
‘pushed’ is actually being pushed by itself. As such the reason for the movement is the result of that 
actual movement. It is not known by common sense that the movement of each single thing has been 
caused by something external that caused it to move. Thus, it is not known whether there is something 
innate inside the object which causes itself to move and that is why some of the earlier philosophers 
did some research on this topic. This is also the case for the alternative, where there are many 
philosophers who believe that it is not necessary for something which is external to it to bring it into 
existence.
190
 The problem is that some people such as al-Ghazali think that there is no change in the 
condition nor anything that causes or makes the being who ‘pushes’ the universe to come into 
existence to change it from a state of being inactive (where he didn’t push the universe to come into 
existence) to a state of activity (where he pushed the universe to come into existence).
191
 A similar 
example to this would be a teacher who goes from being someone who isn’t teaching to go into 
teaching. It needs something eternal to cause it to change its state from being a non-teacher into a 
teacher. All types of change are in need of the thing that causes them to change. The thing that has 
caused the other objects to change is happening due to a change in either the substance, or either in 
its state, or its quantity or on its locality or any of the other basic foundational states. According to 
many philosophers, we can use the concept of pre-eternity for something which is innately pre-eternal 
or it pre-eternal due to something else. Some have also argued that it is possible for there to be a 
occurrence of change on a pre-eternal entity.  For example, according to the theological group the 
Karamites, something that is pre-eternal can have a non-eternal will. Such as according to some of 
the Greek philosophers the possibility of the destruction of the prime matter (Hayula) even though 
according to them it is pre-eternal and something that is the product of the creator who is pre-eternal.  
It is also the case according to them that the one who ‘pushes’ something to come into existence can 
do at times do it by themselves or it can at times occur due to nature. Then in terms of how it is 
possible that the act occurs from the one who ‘pushes’ it into existence to the both of them are not 
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exactly the same thing in terms of them being in need of the reason that ‘pushes’ them into existence. 
The question then arises whether both of these categories that are ‘pushed’ by the creator are limited 
in any capacity or whether there is any explicit analogy which makes the creator different to the 
creator that causes by his own nature and then who causes without his own will. Both of these issues 
are much larger and must be clarified and explained separately according to the earlier philosophers. 
Picking and dealing with one of the issues as opposed to all of the relevant issues related to this matter 
is one of the seven sophistic arguments of the sophistic philosophers. This error in dealing with one 
of the fundamentals will result in there being a large number of errors in terms of testing issues related 
to the existing things.
192
 
Imam al-Ghazali argued regarding the position of Avicenna that there are two main problems with 
his position. The first is that there is no logical reason for rejecting the statement of the people who 
state that the universe came into existence by the pre-eternal will of God which pre-eternally 
necessitated the existence of the universe in the specific time that it came into the existence. Then 
the universe remained in the state of non-necessity up until the time that someone external, such as 
the pre-eternal creator, specifies that it comes into existence and as such its existence began at the 
point that it was specified that it would come into existence. As such, how is it not possible that it was 
ready to come into existence before the specified time, but it never did as no one willed for it to come 
into existence and as such it never became a reality then its existence came under the pre-eternal will 
of God and as such it became a reality?
193
 Averroes was not impressed with the position relayed by 
al-Ghazali, he argued that it lacked detail and was not well thought out. He argued that the reason for 
the statement was that he was unable to argue against the fact that the effect of the act cannot be 
delayed, but instead he claimed that the effect of the will can be delayed, which means that it is 
possible for there to be a delay in an act that comes from the will. But as for the act of the one who 
performs the action, it cannot be delayed, so when one performs the act it should happen 
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immediately. Another problem with this position is that as well as the issue of the act being delayed 
from the will, the act cannot be delayed for the one who has the free will to choose that he performs 
an act. Which means that there is a further flaw in the argument of al-Ghazali and as such he has to 
make one of two arguments. The first is that the act of the one who performs an action doesn’t cause 
a change within him, which means that it would be necessary that the change has come from 
something external or that some of these changes occur due to a thing that is changeable itself without 
there being any need of an external effect that causes it to change. Therefore, there are some changes 
that can happen to something that is pre-eternal without anything external causing it to change and 
this is the reason as to why al-Ghazali should be using one of these two arguments as his opponents 
are focused on the latter argument. The first problem with this position is that when one performs 
an act it necessitates a change within him and anything that changes requires something external to 
have caused it to have changed. The second problem is that something which is pre-eternal cannot 
be affected by change and something al-Ghazali has had great difficulty in trying to explain. The 
Ashari scholars have left themselves in quite a bind on this issue unless they accept that the status of 
the one who causes the effect of creating the universe is not the same and nor is it in the same 
condition as it was before or whilst it was creating it. It will most definitely necessitate that there is 
some form of renewing or some form of connection that did not previously exist either in the one 
who caused the creation the universe or the thing that has been affected or both of them. If that is 
the case, then it is called renewing. If we accept that any type of new state needs something to have 
caused it to be brought into that state, then we have to accept that the one who caused this new state 
is a different causer, this would then mean that the first causer would not actually be the first and as 
such it will not be self-containing in terms of its act but instead it will need something else to have 
caused the change, unless the reason for being in that state is that there is some type of condition in 
the act of the one who causes the change himself. What this means is that the act that is coming from 
him will not be coming from him sequentially one after the other, but instead it will be due to a 
condition in the subject in which it is affecting change and as such as you can see his position is 
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unavoidable.
194
  Unless one were to accept that some of the conditions that occur in the one who 
causes it do not need someone external from it to cause them, but to accept that is quite far-fetched 
unless there are a group of people who think that things can occur spontaneously without there being 
any reason for them to occur, which was the belief of the people who deny the existence of God and 
the weakness of this statement is quite clear. Also, the criticism of al-Ghazali is contradictory as he 
argues that the pre-eternal will and the will which is not pre-eternal can occur in a similar manner. 
The reason for this is that the will that is witnessed by us demonstrates some type of potentiality in 
the person, in terms of them doing one of two possible different things. It can also be used in the 
possibility of the subject being affected by it in an equal manner. Because the will is the desire of the 
one who causes the act towards the act and when the act is actually performed the desire to complete 
it disappears because the goal has been accomplished. This desire of performing the act and the act 
coming into reality is equally workable with the opposite things. When we claim that there is a person 
who wills one of the two opposite things, that will is pre-eternal, so that will transform the state from 
being possible into being necessary. But if they claim that the will is pre-eternal then it would mean 
that the will does not disappear even after achieving the goal, since this will does not have a beginning 
and so is not limited to one time.
195
 In terms of achieving that goal, unless we believe that there is 
something which is causing the existence of the causer and this is not due to natural affects nor by his 
will and that is what is known as will. Averroes continued that there is some strong analogical link 
that proves that is some form of link between these two opposites, such as for example existence 
which is not in the universe and is not outside the universe.
196
 
Al-Ghazali says that according to the philosophers, the universe coming into existence after not being 
would mean that there has been a change in God and thus they instead believe in the eternity of the 
universe. But according to al-Ghazali the model followed by the philosophers still leaves them with 
the same problem, which is that there is some kind of change in God which is that the universe has 
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been created in this specific way as opposed to being created in a different way. What he means by 
this is that the universe and everything that comes within the creation of the universe works within a 
specific manner, whether it is the direction of the wind, the movement of the planets, and the laws of 
nature. The fact that the universe has been created in this specific way is because of God making a 
choice to do so, and if he had chosen the alternative then everything would be different, but the fact 
that they are as we see them is because of God choosing it to be like this. He argues that if God 
choosing for the universe to be in a specific way does not mean that there has been a change in God 
then similarly God creating the universe out of nothing also does not entail that there has been a 
change in God.
197
 Although al-Ghazali has made a strong point he doesn’t really counter the point of 
Avicenna with his position, because Avicenna does not say that by God choosing the universe to be 
in this specific way as opposed to a different way is a decision in ‘time’ according to Avicenna, but 
instead in his position Gods’ creation of the universe out of nothing and for that creation to be in a 
specific manner is not in time but instead by essence. If either are in time then according to Avicenna 
one is applying time to God and this would mean that one is diminishing God to the level of his 
creation. Therefore al-Ghazali is still left with the same dilemma which is that he has still not answered 
the two points which were posited by Avicenna, which is the idea of time applied to God in the 
temporal model followed by al-Ghazali and the fact that there is delay in the action between God 
willing for something to happen and then for this will to come into existence after a period of ‘time’.  
Averroes attempts to refute the second argument of al-Ghazali pertaining to the possibility of the 
temporal being as a result of an eternal.
198
 He argues that the position of Ghazali would only be valid 
if we consider God to be like creation, meaning that in the first cause argument he proposes he argues 
that each accidental that is caused had an accidental before it and that accidental had another accident 
preceding it and as such there must be a first cause.
199
 Like a set of dominoes that fall one on top of 
another, each piece of domino that falls needs the previous domino to fall onto it and that domino 
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needed a previous domino and this would continue until we get to the first domino which in the case 
of al-Ghazali would be God. The problem with this argument is that God is being relegated to the 
same time and space as his creation as the first domino in relation to the second domino is the same 
as the third domino in relation to the second the only difference is that the first domino preceding it. 
Therefore, in terms of time-space it is the same as the other temporal entities.  
Averroes does not accept the argument of al-Ghazali that God being before the universe does not 
mean that there is time. He argues that based on the weakness of the argument al-Ghazali, it would 
mean that either one believes that God is before the universe in time, which would then mean that 
there is pre-eternal time which was not created by God, or one has to agree with the premise of 
Avicenna and Averroes that God is not related to the universe by time, which will mean that universe 
is eternal but created by God.
200
 Averroes does not deny that God has a will, but the will of God is 
not like that of a human. He rejects the possibility that God can do two exact opposite actions, such 
as it is a necessity that God always chooses the best, which would that mean that God will always do 
what is best, but this conflicts with the idea that God has a choice and he wills and therefore it would 
mean that the world is naturally caused meaning without a choice.  
 
 
Razi and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Fakhruddin Razi was a scholar from the twelfth century who was born in modern day Iran. One of 
the people he studied with was the pupil of Majd al-Din al-Jili, who himself was the student of al-
Ghazali. Fakhruddin Razi was one of the founding fathers of modern Ash'ari theology. In current 
times a large proportion of Sunni Muslims follow Ashari theology. Contemporary Ashari theology, 
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is based on positions that are narrated by a handful of classical scholars, two of which are Fakhruddin 
Razi and al-Ghazali. The basis of the arguments of al-Ghazali are considered as the presentation and 
defence of the position of the Ashari School. Therefore the position of Fakhruddin Razi is very 
relevant to the current discussion to see if it was the case that the entirety of Muslim Scholars agreed 
with the abandonment of Avicenna.  
According to Fakhruddin Razi, Imam Ghazali did not specifically target Avicenna but instead he was 
speaking about philosophers in general as he was comparing the position of Avicenna to the statement 
of Aristotle who said matter is pre-eternal or Plato who said that it is not pre-eternal. Fakhruddin Razi 
argues that al-Ghazali did not understand the point that was being made by Avicenna. He not only 
confirms that there is no theological problem with the position of Avicenna about the pre-eternity of 
the matter, but more than that he states that the disagreement is only verbal and not real.
201
 Quite 
likely Razi is trying throw water onto the situation, which could mean that this was Razi’s way of 
agreeing with Avicenna without having the weight of the enemies of Avicenna against him.  
 
 
Tusi and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Nasir al-Din al-Tusi is a scholar from the thirteenth from Persia. He was an ardent follower of the 
Avicennian tradition. He wrote Sharh al-isharat which is a commentary on Avicenna's book Al-isharat 
wa al-Tanbihat (Remarks and Admonitions). He wrote this as a defence of the position of Avicenna. 
He disagrees with the position of Fakhruddin Razi who argued that the disagreement between al-
Ghazali and Avicenna was not a real disagreement and was merely a polemical disagreement without 
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any real substance. He states that Fakhruddin Razi made this judgment ‘without the agreement of the 
two opponents’. Tusi explains that when theologians write their books they start their books by first 
presenting the proof of the universe coming into existence after not existing. They form this argument 
without mentioning the name of the agent (the creator), never mind the fact that they do not present 
whether it was this creator who brought this universe into existence and whether this creation 
occurred by his free choice or without it. They then normally precede to mention that if the universe 
came into existence after not being, then it needs someone to bring it from non-existence into existence. 
They then proceed to argue that the one who brings the universe into existence has to have his own choice 
or will since if he does not have his own will then the act would come into existence without his will, which 
means that it would occur naturally as opposed to a pre-emptive decision being made by a creator and 
this would then necessitate that the universe is also pre-eternal which is incorrect. Because of what they 
mentioned before and based on this they made their statement about the will and the established the will 
on the hadith (Bringing something into existence out of nothing). Tusi further elaborates that in terms of 
rejecting the notion of cause and effect then this issue not agreed upon by the detractors of Avicenna. 
This lack of consensus amongst the detractors of Avicenna was explicitly confirmed by the Mutazalite 
scholars as well as according to Nasir al-Din al-Tusi ‘the virtuous person’ (he is referring to Fakhr al-Din 
al-Razi).
202
 
Nasir al-Din al-Tusi further elaborated that the Ashari scholars believe in the philosophical position of 
the eight pre-eternals which they call the initial attributes. Within the Ashari scholars there is a 
disagreement regarding the specifics of this position. Some of them believe that the necessary existence 
by its own essence is the ninth pre-eternal whilst others believe that necessary existence by its own essence 
is the cause of the other eight pre-eternals. This entire issue is related to cause and effect. Regarding this 
issue even though the Asharis are avoiding admitting it explicitly in its essence it is unavoidable. From this 
what we understand is that the matter of cause and effect is not an agreed upon issue but what is agreed 
upon by them is the universe being created out of nothing. But as for the Philosophers, they do not deny 
that the pre-eternal can cause by his own will, but they say that a pre-eternal act is impossible except by 
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the pre-eternal cause who is perfect in this attribute of being the cause. Based on this, it is impossible for 
his act to also be pre-eternal. Because according to them the creation of the universe is a pre-eternal act, 
so they have attributed it to the pre-eternal cause whose attribute of causing is perfect.  
In terms of the start point (the creator), he is pre-eternal, perfect in his attribute of creating, so that the 
universe which is his act is also pre-eternal and these ideas are dealt with in the subject of metaphysics. 
But they did not say that his the almighty or the all willing. Instead all they said was that his power and his 
will do not necessitate plurality (non-uniqueness) in his essence. His attribute of creating is not the same 
as the attribute of willing and creating of a human nor as the attribute of creating of one who was forced 
to cause an effect such as those that come from natural matters.
203
 
 
 
Adhudiddin al-Iji and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Imam Adhudiddin al-Iji was a fourteenth century scholar born in Ij near Shiraz. He is a famous 
Ashari scholar and his books on Ashari theology are considered the main sources of reference for 
those followers of Asharism. Therefore, if he holds a specific position it has a huge impact on the 
followers of Ashari theology. His positions are therefore generally considered reliable for the 
followers of the school. The fact that one cannot apply time on God is agreed upon between 
Philosophers and Theologians even though their resulting reasoning may differ. Adhudiddin al-Iji 
presents the argument that God is not in time. This was a position that was agreed upon by scholars 
of religions. He explained that according to the philosophers, time not being applied to God is based 
on the idea that time is the length of the movement of the finite things, and this time being applied is 
not possible for the something that does not have any movement or direction such as an eternal being 
who is God. Iji explains that according to theologians, he himself falling into this category, that in 
terms of the impossibility of time being applied to God, that is because when we have an accidental 
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that can change such as the universe and that relies on another changing accidental for its 
measurement such as time, then both of these accidentals cannot be connected to God and as such 
time cannot be applied to God. As such, irrespective of which of the two positions one follows, 
whether it is the temporal modal or the eternal modal, one cannot apply time to God. Therefore, Iji 
explains that if one were to believe that the universe is related to time based on both of them being 
accidentals such as the position he himself follows as well as the rest of the Ashari scholars or it is 
related by its essence as is the position of Avicenna and Arsitotle, the pre-existence of God is not 
related to time according to the opinion of both parties, nor does it mean that his continuous 
existence relies on him existing in two separate times, nor does it mean that by God being pre-eternal 
he existed in a time before all time.
204
 
Sayf al-Din al-Amidi is an Ashari scholar from the thirteenth century. His positions are also relied 
upon in the Ashari School. He is a respected scholar and his position is considered authoritative. Iji 
relayed the position of Amidi who also stated that the consensus that the creation of the universe 
does not depend on the one who has the ability to choose. In essence what they are saying is that the 
cause of the universe can occur naturally without their being someone who wills it into existence. The 
Philosophers argue that the existence of the universe does not depend on the one who causes who 
causes due to himself. The theologians accept the fact that the creator causes by himself and if this is 
the case then there is no issue with the universe depending on him and it is agreed that it is possible 
for the universe to come into existence by someone who created it. It was in this aspect that Ghazali 
was over stretching in his Takfeer (statement of disbelief about the issue of pre-eternity), because did 
God create the universe by himself or by his choice, so it will depend on God and this is not based 
on choice. Therefore, it is agreed upon by the scholars that the existence of the universe is depending 
on the causer and the effect of the one who causes will exist eternally as his essence. According to Iji 
it not an agreed upon that there is a consensus that the universe came into existence and is dependent 
on the Mukhtaar (the one who has a choice). Because the act of the one who has a choice will come 
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into effect when his desire to create comes into effect, which will necessitate time, that the time of 
desire is actually not relevant because you ‘first’ desire something ‘then’ the resulting effect occurs, 
so the actual time of the desire is not relevant. Therefore, the real disagreement should only be 
regarding whether God necessitates the creation of the universe or whether it is by choice. Iji 
explained that Nasir al-Din al-Tusi said that God is not like a magnet where things are caused by him 
without his will, because holding the position of the pre-eternity of the universe does not mean that 
God doesn’t have a choice.205  
Amidi continued that he found the statement of scholars who rejected and accepted both positions. 
Amidi said that God creating it is possible it came from non-existence, if you say God created by 
himself or by his choice, latter Asharis admonish Amidi regarding this issue as he is basically stating 
that there is no problem with holding either one of the positions. It is the same as the pre-eternity of 
the universe necessitates the superiority of the essence and not because of time, the situation is exactly 
the same here as time comes first. According to Iji there is no difference between those who hold the 
position of pre-eternity of the universe and those who hold the position of creating the universe out 
of nothing then in terms of negating pre-eternity and something coming before something else. Iji, 
the renowned Ashari scholar further explains that the disagreement between the two contesting 
parties is superficial.
206
 Therefore what we can see is that these two renowned, authoritative Ashari 
scholars do not adhere to the perception that the position of Avicenna was heretical and was not 
accepted by Muslims.  
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Ibn Arabi and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Ibn Arabi who was also known as Shaykh Al-Akbar, "the greatest master", was a Sunni scholar of Islam 
from the thirteenth century who was a Sufi mystic and philosopher. The position of Ibn Arabi holds a lot 
of weight on this issue because of the acceptance and respect he holds with followers of mainstream Sunni 
Islam. Generally, the Sufi mystics held that the universe was eternal but it was created by God. Ibn Arabi 
was a known for holding the position of the universe being eternal and this was especially the case with 
those who considered him as their enemy. For example, Ibn Daqiq al Eid narrated that he heard 
Izzuradeen Ibn Adus Salaam talking about Ibn Arabi and he was stating that he is a liar and an evil scholar, 
as he believes in the pre-eternity of the universe and doesn’t believe in the prohibition of fornication.207 It 
wasn’t just Ibn Arabi from the Sufi mystics who held this position but it was generally the agreed upon 
position amongst the Sufi mystics. For example, Abdurrahman al-Jami explained that the Sufi Mystics 
supported the position of the pre-eternity of the universe being created by an eternal God. It was based 
on this idea that they merged the idea of the eternal will of God and his eternal effect which is the created 
universe. The Sufi Mystics claimed that they came to this position based on Kashf (divine enlightenment)208 
that through this divine enlightenment they came to the understanding that if an eternal being is the cause 
of something else such as the universe by its essence, then it will be connected to it continuously as long 
as its essence exists, which means that both the eternal creator and the creation of the universe existed 
together eternally.
209
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Suhurwardi and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi was a Sunni scholar of Islam, Sufi mystic, and philosopher from the twelfth 
century. One of his teachers, Majd al-Din al-Jili was also the teacher of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. Al-Suhrawardi 
was also known as shaykh al-ishraq (Master of Illumination) and was a follower of the Avicennian 
Peripatetic tradition.  
Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi was one of the main proponents for the pre-eternity of the universe. He 
argued the position from a variety of angles. He argues that motion is a quality that never remains, which 
means that it is an accidental and anything that comes into existence after time is temporal. Any entity 
which depends another temporal entity cannot be pre-eternal but instead must in itself temporal. This is 
because something temporal cannot bring itself into existence, since something has to give it a push to 
make it to come into existence.
210
 If the one who causes will keep it as it was at before coming into 
existence, it will always remain as it was, meaning that it will never come into existence. If we believe that 
this accidental came into existence before another accidental and that accidental came before another it 
will go back infinitely which is impossible. So that proves the pre-eternity of the universe, because then 
there would be an endless chain and we would need to question what created or caused the first accidental 
to exist. So that’s why in existence there are accidentals which are renewable and that have always existed.211  
 
Jurjani and the Pre-eternity of the Universe 
 
Ali ibn Mohammed al-Jurjani also known as al-Sayyid al-Sharif was a sunni Hanafi scholar from the 
fourteenth century from Astarabad. Al-Jurjani in his book ‘Sharh Mowaqif’ deals with the issue of the pre-
eternity of universe. Al-Jurjani brought the statement of Amidi where he states that pre-eternity can only 
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be the attribute of the one who has a choice, so al-Jurjani says that the statement of Amidi is confirmed 
by the Philosophers and that there is a consensus amongst them that the causer effects things by choice 
rather than them occurring naturally such as a magnet. This is because if he does something it is because 
he wants to do it, but he does not do it as this would require time. Anything he wants exists pre-eternally 
and anything that he doesn’t want to exist does not happen. Al-Jurjani then gave some examples, such as 
that the Maturidis and Asharis believe that bringing something into existence and existence are not 
detachable, and if this is the case then if the bringing something into existence is eternal then the existence 
is also pre-eternal. Then Iji brought forward the refutation of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi against Avicenna, which 
wasn’t really a refutation but more of a suggestion, therefore both Iji and Jurjani rejected this so-called 
refutation. Iji then brought forth five criticisms mentioned by the opponents of Avicenna about which Iji 
responded. Jurjani commented that three of the criticisms are weak, whilst the others he responded to by 
supporting the position of Avicenna. Jurjani supported the position of the pre-eternity of the universe 
despite being traditional Sunni scholar of Islam.  Therefore, once again we see that the position of the 
universe being eternal was held by many prominent traditional scholars.
212
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Legacy of the Argument 
 
In the main body the thesis we focused on the analysis of past scholars from Greek philosophers to 
Muslim philosophers regarding their position on the pre-eternity of the universe. This section will look 
at the relevancy of the argument of Avicenna regarding the pre-eternity of the universe in current 
times. We will look at the theories that are presented by physicists and philosophers. This topic in 
current times is often dealt with by physicists with the Big Bang Theory being at the forefront of 
current research. Stephen Hawking quite confidently declared that ‘Philosophy is dead’ because these 
fundamental questions of the nature of the universe is now dealt with by scientists.213 There has been 
major developments in this issue from the Big Bang theory, to Penrose’s Cyclic Conformal Cycle to 
Hawking’s M-Theory214. For the purpose of this thesis, due to the main focus being the classical 
position of Avicenna.  I will only select a few contemporary arguments relayed by physicists and 
philosophers, to see if the positions of Avicenna are still relevant in current times. I believe that it 
would be fruitful for someone to write a thesis focusing purely on this issue.  
 
 
Penrose and Conformal Cyclic Cosmology 
 
Roger Penrose, a leading physicist in current times, in his book ‘Cycles of Time’, writes about the 
theory of Conformal Cyclic Cosmology (CCC). He explained that the Big Bang was a transition point 
within the history of the universe and that in the future of the current universe there will be another 
Big Bang, and before the Big Bang of the current universe there was another Big Bang ad infinitum, 
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with space and time merging at the end point of each cycle. Penrose deals with the issue of entropy 
within the universe. In his model of CCC, he states that entropy was low at the point of the Big Bang 
and then increases as the universe expands. He then explains that then entropy is lost when matter 
enters a black hole. Then in the future when all matter is absorbed by black holes, something will then 
form the next Big Bang. Then this cycle will continue into the next universe, as it occurred in the 
previous universe, before the existence of the current world. He explains that data is being gathered 
by satellites. As such this is a theory that can be tested in current times. This theory of Dr Penrose 
proposes that the universe is eternal moving from one cycle to another. When looking at Avicenna’s 
model of the universe it fits in with Penrose’s theory of Conformal Cyclic Cosmology because both 
models result in an eternal world. It means that scientists in current times a dealing with the same 
question that was being dealt with Avicenna in medieval times. The formation and existence of the 
universe, how we got here, is the universe eternal or temporal, are all very relevant questions that 
being answered by physicists.215 
 
Smolin and Time Reborn 
 
Lee Smolin argues that time is in fact real and not artificial, which has become a common theory due 
to the theory of relativity. Smolin argues that time is real and we can see this based on the evolution 
of the universe that we have witnessed through experimentation and observation. He explains that 
black holes are gateways to new universes and that time is the fourth dimension in space and time. 
He believes that time is a more fundamental dimension than the spacial ones. Once again, the theory 
of time being something that is real but is a measurement of matter is very relevant. Although the 
difference between the arguments of Avicenna and Lee Smolin is that in the model of Smolin, time is 
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a more important dimension in the space-time model, whereas for Avicenna time is merely the 
measurement of the movement of matter. The issue of time being real or unreal was dealt with by 
modern philosophers such as McTaggart who argued that time is not real. This discussion of time being 
real or unreal is quite relevant because in the case of Avicenna and Ghazali the main disagreement 
was whether one could apply time to God. If in current times the discussion has moved to whether 
time is real or whether it is linear, then it adds a new dimension to the disagreement of Avicenna and 
al-Ghazali.216   
 
McTaggart and the Unreality of Time 
 
What makes the argument of Dr Smolin all the more relevant is the position relayed by McTaggart, a 
twentieth century philosopher, who argued that time was not real. He stated that ‘I believe that 
nothing that exists can be temporal, and that therefore time is unreal’. McTaggart makes a distinction 
between A-Series Properties and B-Series Properties. He explained that B-Series Properties are first 
class properties which are temporal, permanent and include terms such as ‘earlier than’ and ‘later 
than’, for example if A occurs before B, then it means A will always occur before B. A-Series properties 
are second class properties which are temporal but not permanent, which includes past, present and 
future. So if an event is in the future it doesn’t always mean that it will be in the future. McTaggart 
argued that nothing contains A-Series properties, and if this is the case then nothing exists in time. He 
continues that time cannot only be a B-Series property, because a B-Series does not contain the idea 
of change. He then argues that time forming in an A-Series is contradictory. Since in both Series when 
one analyses all possibilities of how reality can be temporal, it does not result in an adequate, non-
contradictory response and as such McTaggart reaches is that reality is not temporal, and therefore 
                                                          
216 Smolin L, Time Reborn, (Penguin Books, London, 2013) 
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time is unreal.217 The fact that modern philosophers such as McTaggart, Wittgenstein and Van 
Inwagen218 are dealing with the issue of time being real or temporal or non-linear shows that this 
argument is still relevant in current times.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
217 MacTaggart J.E, The Unreality of Time, Published in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 
17 (1908), 456-473 
218 Van Inwagen P, Metaphysics, (Westview Press, USA, 2015) 
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Conclusion 
The topic of the pre-eternity of the universe is an issue that has been presented, analysed and debated 
from the time of Greek philosophers to the time of Muslim philosophers to contemporary 
philosophers and physicists.  The reason why a greater emphasis was placed on this issue within the 
Muslim world was because of the charge of ‘heresy’ and ‘disbelief’ that was placed on Avicenna by al-
Ghazali. The perception amongst Muslims was that Avicenna was a disbeliever due to the positon he 
held and that he was a single rogue that had gone against the accepted position of Muslims during his 
time and throughout the intellectual history of Islam. Therefore it was important to analyse whether 
Avicenna was wrong in the position that he held, whether he truly was a ‘rogue’ scholar as was claimed 
or were there other scholars who held the same position as him and finally whether the arguments of 
Avicenna are relevant in current philosophical and scientific discussions.  
Through the analysis of the debate between Avicenna and al-Ghazali we found that things were not 
actually as they were presented. The basis of the positon of Avicenna was to ensure that time or 
change was not applied to God and so that God was not relegated to the level of his creation. He did 
not agree with the position of al-Ghazali that there was no universe and then later at a specific point 
in time God decided to create the universe. This according to Avicenna means that his opponents who 
believe in a temporal world are applying time to God as well as the fact that it means that there was 
a change in God. We have analysed the different aspects of change and how they would apply to God 
when it comes to God deciding to make a decision at a specific point in time. Avicenna has shown his 
commitment to the fundamentals of Islam by ensuring that this humanisation of God doesn’t occur as 
he is the creator and creation cannot be applied to him. Avicenna therefore presents his model of the 
universe were the world is eternal, where time is not applied to God, that God created the universe 
not in time but instead by essence and as such has superiority over the eternal universe. Therefore 
the charge of the universe being equivalent to God becomes muted.  
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The second question the assignment looked to answer was whether Avicenna truly was a rogue 
scholar who held that the universe is eternal, where he was ‘exiled’ by Muslim scholars and his position 
was not accepted. We have analysed the positons held by past scholars on this issue and found that 
this wasn’t actually the case. In fact many scholars either held the same position as Avicenna or 
remained neutral on the issue. We read that the Maturidi and Ashari (the two theological Sunni 
schools) scholars held either the same position as Avicenna, remained neutral as they believed that 
the argument is not real and the difference is merely semantics or they held that Avicenna did not 
traverse the bounds of Islam as he still held that God was the creator but instead did not want to apply 
time to God. Although the position that the difference between them is merely semantics is quite 
weak, the fact that these scholars held these positions shows that the so called ‘heresy’ of the positon 
of Avicenna is not as clear cut as has been presented by Muslim scholars through the last thousand 
years.  
The last question that was covered briefly (something that can be undertaken as a specific thesis) was 
the relevance of the positon of Avicenna in current times. When Avicenna was disowned by the 
Muslim world, and it was deemed unacceptable to read and teach his works, many of his arguments 
were relegated to unread positions of heresy and disbelief. We have seen that the issue of pre-eternity 
of matter as well as issues related to time are still analysed in current times by philosophers and 
scientists. The fact that it was impermissible to use the positions of Avicenna means that there was a 
void in the development of scientific research and philosophical enquiry. Had this not happened 
maybe the developments that occurred in the field of science would have occurred earlier. We are 
now finding out that modern theories such as Dr Penrose’s Conformal Cyclic Cosmology which propose 
an eternal universe develop the medieval positon of Avicenna based on modern day research and 
ideas. I believe that further research in this specific area would be beneficial once many in the Muslim 
world move past the intellectual hang-up that it is not permissible to study the works of Avicenna.  
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